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Summary
Background
Work Focused Interviews for Partners (WFIPs) were introduced in April 2004 in all
Jobcentre Plus offices. Partners of those claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA),
Income Support (IS), Incapacity Benefit (IB) or Severe Disablement Allowance (SDA)
are now required to attend a single interview to discuss the possibility of working.
An important role of a WFIP is to promote the New Deal for Partners (NDP). This has
existed in some form since 1999 but was enhanced at the same time WFIPs were
introduced, having been re-modelled along the lines of the New Deal for Lone
Parents. This is a voluntary programme offering a range of support to help partners
consider taking up employment. Eligibility is similar to that for WFIP except that
those in receipt of Carer’s Allowance are also eligible. It is available in both Jobcentre
Plus and non-Jobcentre Plus areas.
This report presents the results of a quantitative evaluation of the impact of WFIP
and NDP. Specifically, it is concerned with the extent to which WFIP influences
participation in NDP and the extent to which WFIP and NDP affect labour market
outcomes. The outcomes considered are benefit receipt and employment.
The stock and the flow
The operation of WFIP differs according to the duration of the benefit claim at the
time of WFIP introduction. For claims under 26 weeks at this time (referred to as the
‘flow’ in this report), partners are invited to interview once the claim reaches the 26
week point or, if the partnership begins after the spell has passed the six-month
mark, as soon as the partnership forms. For claims longer than 26 weeks at the time
of WFIP introduction (the ‘stock’), partners must attend a WFIP within three years.
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Data
The impact assessment was based on administrative data. These were not designed
with evaluation in mind, and there were some problems that, to some extent,
shaped the approach taken to the analysis. Two key issues were:
• lack of precise knowledge of the time Jobcentres integrated into the Jobcentre
Plus network;
• inability to precisely identify the eligible population from administrative benefits
data. The eligible population identified in Jobcentre Plus areas using information
on benefit spells was much larger than that recorded in the WFIP participants’
database.
Evaluation approach
The impact estimates were produced using two alternative strategies:
• Difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates are based on a comparison of changes
before and after the introduction of the intervention among those eligible to
participate with similar changes among those not eligible to participate;
• Instrumental variable (IV) estimates exploit the fact that stock records were
downloaded to the Labour Market System (LMS) over a two-month period and
the order of download was determined by a random number. Since the timing
of download affects the probability of participating in WFIP but does not affect
outcomes, this allows the impact of WFIP participation to be identified.
Descriptive statistics
The data provided some information on characteristics of the population and the
WFIP experience. Key issues include:
• about a quarter of benefit spells were less than a year in duration but more than
half were at least three years long;
• on average, WFIPs were booked for flow partners 30 days after becoming eligible.
For stock partners, the average was 123 days;
• in 38 per cent of stock cases and 34 per cent of flow cases, partners attending a
WFIP declined offers of further help. In five per cent of stock cases and eight per
cent of flow cases, the WFIP destination was recorded as ‘into work’ or ‘partner
working over 24 hours’;
• NDP take up following WFIP is much more common than self-referral. Only 0.5
per cent of those who had not attended a WFIP participated in NDP, compared
to 3.5 per cent of those who had attended a WFIP;
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• more than half of all cases were IS spells (closer to three-quarters for the stock).
The remainder divided quite evenly between JSA and IB1;
• For the stock, spells on JSA tended to be shorter than spells on IS or IB: 43 per
cent of JSA spells were under a year in duration at go-live day while 43 and 56
per cent respectively of IS and IB spells were longer than five years;
• dependent children were present in the households of 64 per cent of stock
couples. In about three-quarters of cases the youngest child was of pre-secondary
school age;
• the main over-representation of WFIP stock partners appears to be in Scotland,
Wales, the North East and North West England;
• Seventy-two per cent of stock partners who remain on benefit will not have
attended a Work Focused Interview (WFI) within a year of their records being
downloaded (although as stated previously, Jobcentre Plus offices have up to
three years to clear stock cases from the time they convert to Jobcentre Plus).
Impact estimates
With the DiD estimates, the longest outcome observed was 37 weeks after eligibility
commences. For IV estimates, outcomes up to 12 (28-day) months after WFIP
participation were observed.
The most complete analysis was possible when considering the effects of WFIP. The
key results are:
• for stock couples, WFIP eligibility appeared to reduce benefit claims after 37
weeks by about one percentage point;
• WFIP participation reduced benefit claims (37 weeks after eligibility) among stock
by at most 4.6 percentage points if one assumes WFIP had no deterrent effect.
Since significant effects were evident sooner after eligibility than WFIP participation
usually takes place, this assumption is unlikely to hold – the true effect of
participation will be lower;
• there is no evidence to suggest that WFIP encouraged the movement from
non-employment to employment among stock couples;
• stock couples on JSA were more likely to exit benefit than those on other benefits,
those with less than two years benefit duration were more likely to exit than
those who had been on benefit for longer. Those aged 25-45 were more likely
to exit than those who were older or younger than this;
1 It should be noted that partners are not benefit claimants in their own right –
these IS spells relate to the benefit spell of the main claimant and relate to when
the partner became part of their claim.
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• no significant effects of WFIP eligibility or participation were evident for flow
couples. This was true when considering the population as a whole and when
considering results separately according to whether claiming JSA or according
to age.
• participation in WFIP appeared to increase NDP participation by about 3.5
percentage points (NDP participation among those who had not attended a
WFIP was 0.5 per cent). For stock couples, it was possible to look at variations
across subgroups in the effect on NDP take-up. As with the consideration of
benefit outcomes, those on benefit for less than two years, those claiming JSA
and those aged 25-45 were more likely than their counterparts to respond to
WFIP participation by participating in NDP.
When considering the effects of NDP and WFIP/NDP combined, the data problems
were more evident and the results should be treated with some caution. In view of
this, they are presented as indicative rather than precise results:
• there is marginal evidence that NDP eligibility reduces benefit claims among
stock couples. The effect of WFIP/NDP combined is estimated to be similar,
although these results appear more significant
• for flow couples, the effects of NDP and NDP/WFI combined were found to be
more substantial and significant.
Conclusion
This report provides robust evidence on the effect of the introduction of WFIPs and
indicative results on the effects of NDP. The estimated effects of WFIP are the most
policy-relevant results since they capture the effects of a mandatory WFIP and any
resulting NDP participation.
The results show that WFIP eligibility increased benefit exits among stock couples by
about one percentage point (roughly 77 per cent of stock couples were on benefit
37 weeks after their eligibility commenced) but not among flow couples. This may
reflect a deterrent effect – stock couples ending their benefit spell rather than
participate in a WFIP. There was no detectable increase in employment for stock
couples. However, the data available do not permit investigation of increased hours
of working as a result of WFIP.
WFIPs have been successful in increasing NDP participation by about 3.5 percentage
points. Relative to the small proportion of eligible partners entering NDP this
represents a substantial increase.
It is possible that this increase in NDP participation may, in turn, lead to a reduction
in benefit claims. There is little reason to believe this will happen for stock couples.
For couples newly entering WFIP eligibility, however, the results suggest that NDP
may be effective in encouraging a move away from benefits.
5Introduction
1 Introduction
1.1 An overview of Work Focused Interviews for
Partners/New Deal for Partners
In recent years, partners of benefit claimants have attracted increasing policy
attention. Following the Chancellor’s 1998 announcement that partners of
unemployed people (who are themselves out of work or working part-time) should
have access to employment programmes on the same basis as jobseekers, the New
Deal for Partners of Unemployed People (NDPU) was launched in April 1999. This
was a voluntary programme to help partners of those receiving Jobseeker’s
Allowance (JSA) to improve their prospects of finding work. In April 2001, the
eligible group was broadened to include partners of those claiming Income Support
(IS), Incapacity Benefit (IB), Severe Disablement Allowance (SDA) and Invalid Care
Allowance2 (ICA).3 Accordingly, NDPU was renamed the New Deal for Partners
(NDP).
Take up of NDP was low – only about two per cent of those invited to an initial
interview actually attended – and this was attributed to the programme having little
to offer partners, particularly since many partners had substantial labour market
issues, such as poor health and caring responsibilities (for example, Arrowsmith,
2004). To address this, NDP was re-designed along the lines of the New Deal for
Lone Parents (NDLP) and was re-launched nationally in April 2004.
2 ICA has since been replaced by Carer’s Allowance (CA).
3 On 25 October 2004, eligibility for NDP was extended to those in a family in
receipt of Working Tax Credits who are either not working or working less than
16 hours a week and to partners of people claiming Pension Credit who are not
working or work less than 24 hours a week. Such partners are not considered in
this report.
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In addition to provision previously available through NDP (which includes assistance
with jobsearch, information about in-work benefits/tax credits and access to the
Adviser Discretion Fund), the relaunched programme includes:
• an increase in the Training Allowance (from £10 to £15) for people on approved
training under NDP;
• entry into the revised work incentives scheme from October 2004 including the
revised Job Grant;
• access to a childcare subsidy for partners taking up work of less than 16 hours a
week;
• access to the same training available under NDLP;
• access to debt counselling services;
• increasing to six months the length of time a partner can ‘test trade’ under the
self-employed option, for partners in receipt of IS or JSA for 18 months or more.
Interested partners can access the NDP services on a self-referral basis without
having to satisfy a minimum period of eligibility. This reflects evidence which shows
that the longer a couple have been workless, the more difficult it is to find work
(Bonjour and Dorsett 2002).
The re-launch of NDP coincided with the introduction of Work Focused Interviews
for partners (WFIP). Attendance at such a meeting is mandatory and the aim is to
ensure that all partners understand the range of help available to them. Hence, an
important role of WFIP is to encourage participation in NDP.
WFIP was introduced in Jobcentre Plus office areas in April 2004 and will be
extended to the rest of the UK as more areas integrate with the Jobcentre Plus
network. National roll-out of Jobcentre Plus is scheduled to complete in 2006.
Eligibility for WFIP is similar to that for NDP except that those in receipt of CA alone
are not eligible. The design of WFIP takes its lead from the requirements placed on
lone parents to attend a Work Focused Interview (WFI). A system of deferrals and
waivers is in place to protect partners for whom work is not a viable option. Partners
are required to participate in a single interview and any further involvement (such as
NDP) is purely voluntary. However, failure to attend or participate in WFIP can result
in the customer’s benefit being sanctioned indefinitely until the partner participates.
The operation of WFIP differs according to the duration of the benefit claim at the
time of local introduction. For claims under 26 weeks at this time (referred to as the
‘flow’ in the remainder of this report), partners are invited to interview once the
claim reaches the 26 week point. For claims longer than this at the time of local
introduction (the ‘stock’), partners must attend a WFIP within three years.
71.2 Policy objectives
The high-level policy objectives of WFIP and NDP are to:
• reduce the number of workless households;
• encourage partners in workless households to achieve a successful and sustainable
entry into employment;
• help progression to better and/or full-time work for partners already working
part-time;
• create the conditions for those who are not immediately job ready to make or
regain contact with the labour market by assisting them to acquire the skills,
confidence and social stability to increase their employment opportunities and
to compete effectively in the labour market;
• give partners parity with other benefit claimants in accessing Jobcentre Plus
programmes;
• reduce child poverty.
The lower-level objectives are to:
• extend Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) services and labour market
opportunities to clients who have traditionally been excluded from such sources
of assistance and so make partners aware of the services they can access now
and in the future;
• provide the opportunity to increase the hours individual partners are working,
their earnings, and the general standards of living of households;
• make the most effective use of public money, in terms of encouraging partners
to move into work;
• improve partners’ attitudes, confidence, sense of wellbeing and self-esteem;
• increase the numbers both seeking and moving into DWP programmes;
• improve awareness/knowledge of benefits and routes into DWP programmes,
training and work, and of any other issues/information that are important to the
client group in helping them to return to and sustain work;
• improve motivation, work skills/experience, qualifications and jobsearch skills of
partners.
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81.3 The evaluation of WFIP/NDP
The overall objective of this evaluation is to examine whether WFIP and NDP are
meeting their policy objectives as outlined above. There are a number of elements
that make up the overall approach to the evaluation:
• impact analysis;
• quantitative survey of eligible clients
• qualitative analysis based on interviews with partners, claimants and staff;
• cost-benefit analysis.
To date, two evaluation reports have been produced: Thomas and Griffiths (2005)
covers the first phase of the qualitative work and Coleman et al. (2006) covers the
quantitative survey of eligible clients. This report is concerned with the impact
analysis. Specifically, it is concerned with the extent to which WFIP influences
participation in NDP and the extent to which WFIP and NDP affect labour market
outcomes. The outcomes considered are benefit receipt and employment.
1.4 Structure of the report
The remainder of this report is as follows. Chapter 2 describes the data. This is a
relatively lengthy discussion, reflecting the extensive manipulation of the data
required for the analysis. Since the research was based on administrative data rather
than survey data collected specifically for evaluation purposes, a number of
assumptions were imposed. These are enumerated in detail together with associated
caveats attached to the eventual results. The method of analysis is described in
Chapter 3. A range of techniques was used. The substantive findings are presented
in Chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 4, the eligible population is described. In Chapter 5,
we present the results of the impact analysis. Chapter 6 concludes.
Introduction
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2 Databases for descriptive
statistics and impact
estimates
Introduction and summary of main points
This chapter describes in detail the data used for this evaluation. The evaluation
was based on administrative data that were not designed with evaluation in
mind. Consequently, a great deal of time was spent manipulating the data to
arrive at a dataset that could be used for the evaluation purposes at hand. For
the purpose of both reference and clarity, the steps taken to achieve this are
described in this chapter. These are necessarily technical and will not be of
interest to all readers. However, the approach to setting up the data is of
central importance to the evaluation and understanding the limitations of the
data helps to interpret the eventual results in a knowledgeable way. For this
reason, the key points relating to the data are summarised below, for those
who wish to get a flavour of the kinds of difficulties associated with using
these data but do not need to know the fine detail. Two datasets were
constructed for this evaluation: one, for a difference-in-differences (DiD)
analysis, the other, for an instrumental variable (IV) analysis. Both of these
approaches are described more fully in Chapter 3 but the purpose here is to
describe the data on which these estimators were based.The DiD analysis was
based on partner data from the Generalised Matching Service (GMS) merged
with claimant data from the Working Age Statistical Database (WASD). The
key issues relating to this are as follows:
• there were some inconsistencies between the dates of spells given in GMS
and WASD. In extreme cases, it was not possible to match partners to main
claimants. However, this was relatively rare and more than 95 per cent of
partner spells were matched, albeit imperfectly;
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• there is a distinction in the analysis between stock and flow cases. The
definition used in this report is that stock cases are those where the main
claimant’s benefit spell started at least six months before Work Focused
Interviews for partners (WFIP) was introduced on 12 April 2004. All other
cases are flow cases;
• GMS sometimes showed partnerships to be ongoing where WASD showed
the spell to have ended. GMS was taken as the more reliable source and
information on the duration of partnerships was used to adjust the recorded
duration of benefit spells in WASD;
• accurate information on which areas are integrated into the Jobcentre Plus
network and when that happened was not available. Steps were taken to
reduce the extent of the problem caused by this but this is only a partial
solution. Offices that integrated into the Jobcentre Plus network after
12 April 2004 were not included in the analysis;
• overall, it was possible to identify most WFIP participants using WASD.
However, there were many partners identified by WASD as eligible who did
not appear in the participants database (which should theoretically include
all those who are eligible). This suggests the WASD overstates WFIP eligibility.
The IV analysis was based on the WFIP participants data and the NDP participants
data:
• data on benefit spells comes from GMS and information on employment
spells is also included, based on Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC)
data;
• the data manipulation required was more straightforward than the kind of
cross-validation carried out for the database used for the DiD analysis and
amounted mainly to removing duplicate spells, merging overlapping spells
etc;
• only the original stock – those couples eligible at 12 April 2004 – were
retained for analysis.
A key feature of these data is that the date at which partners’ records were
downloaded to Labour Market System (LMS) was recorded. This is important
because these downloads took place over a two month period and the order
in which partners’ records were downloaded was organised on a random
basis. This allows for a robust approach to evaluation as explained in
Chapter 3.
2.1 Constructing a database for the difference-in-
differences analysis
2.1.1 Partner records
The WFIP Eligible Population database contains all GMS partner spells for Jobseeker’s
Allowance (JSA), Income Support (IS), Incapacity Benefit (IB) and SDevere Disablement
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Allowance (SDA). These records are related to main claimants who have included
their partner in their claim and are available since May 1999. The file is based on the
partner spells and contains multiple rows if a partner appears in several benefit
claims, for example if the partner is included in both the receipt of IS and IB. If a
partner disappears from one benefit and reappears later or a new partner is
included, the benefit claim of the main claimant appears more than once and
additional information on duration of the partnership indicates the actual duration
of the benefit. Since WFIP eligibility is based on the duration of a main claimant’s
benefit, each eligible spell is uniquely identified by the combination of:
• claimant National Insurance number (NINO);
• partner NINO;
• type of benefit;
• start and end dates of the partnership.
The GMS partner records were merged with the WASD benefit data for main
claimants. The database is updated by periodic scans – these take place every two
weeks for JSA and six weeks for other benefits. The WASD data provide information
on the benefit start date (as observed at the beginning of the claim). Spells are
treated as closed if they disappear from the benefit register between two successive
scans. The recorded end date is imputed randomly between the two scans and
consequently might be up to two weeks before or after the real ending date for JSA
claims and up to six weeks before or after the real ending date for other benefits. In
some cases, the partner spells observed in GMS did not coincide with the benefit
spell of the main claimant as observed in WASD. In such cases, the partner records
were attached to the closest spell found in the WASD data. Partner records were
removed if they could not be merged to main claimants benefit records based on the
NINO.
Some partners may be included that were in receipt of benefits in their own right and
are not eligible for a WFIP. The file contains benefit flags to indicate if the partner was
claiming a benefit e.g. ‘benfg18’ = ‘Y’ indicates that IS was in payment to the partner
during that spell. To qualify the partner for a WFIP, the claimant must be in receipt of
an additional Adult Dependency Increase (ADI) for the partner. However, from the
data there is no way to tell if an ADI was in payment or not.
The data provided by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) contained a
variable identifying if the claimant, partner or both were aged 60 on 12th April
2004, when WFIP was introduced. If either claimant or partner is aged 60+, the
partner is not eligible for WFIP. Such cases were removed from the data used for the
subsequent analysis.
2.1.2 Merging partner records and Working-Age Statistical
Database
The data used in this analysis included all non-claimants records up to February/
March 2005. Because of the delay associated with processing the data for WFIP
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participation, this means that all partners identified for WFIP up until 30 September
2004 should be observed.
WFIP Eligible Population data from JSA claimants
JSA partner scans of GMS are processed fortnightly based on Jobseeker’s Allowance
Payment System (JSAPS). The data supplied to Policy Studies Institute (PSI) contained
1,539,959 rows, and this was matched to WASD using the main claimant NINO. A
partner spell was only matched if sufficiently overlapping the benefit payment, i.e.
the partnership must not begin earlier than 14 days before the beginning of the
claim or later than 14 days after the ending of the main claimants benefit spell. Based
on these rules, a total of 1,347,910 partner/main claimants record were created;
192,049 (12.5 per cent) partner records did not match. Partner spells were then
matched to the closest spell found in the WASD data, even if there was no overlap
(123,682 cases). For 68,367 partner spells, WASD did not contain any benefit spell
for the main claimant NINO of these partner records. These partner records were
removed from the file (4.4 per cent of the original spells file). Appending the original
WASD matches and those non-matches matched back resulted in a JSA eligible
population file with 1,471,592 spells.
WFIP Eligible Population data from IS claimants
IS GMS partner scans are taken every six weeks from ISCS. These scans provide spells
for the period 15/05/1999 until 03/02/2005. The original partner spells file
contained 1,565,232 rows, which were matched to WASD by the main claimant
NINO. A proper match was achieved if a partnership started between 14 days before
the benefit and up to 14 days after the end of the benefit as recorded in WASD data.
When no overlapping benefit spell was found, the partner record was merged to the
closest WASD spell of the main claimants. The merged files based on IS add up to an
eligible population with 1,433,919 spells for the period 1999-2004.
WFIP Eligible Population data from IB/SDA claimants
Partner scans for IB and SDA claims are taken every six weeks from the Pensions
System Computer System (PSCS) and can be identified between 15 May 1999 and
22 January 2005. Based on the scans, a total of 354,558 partner spells was
extracted, and these were matched to WASD using the main claimant NINO. The
spells were merged to any overlapping WASD benefit spell if the beginning date of
the partnership was not earlier than 42 days before the beginning of the benefit
claim found in the WASD data and not later than 42 days after the end of the main
claimants benefit spell. If no overlapping benefit spell was found, the partner spell
was merged to the nearest WASD spell. 17,524 of the partner spells had no main
claimant benefit spell at all and were excluded from the eligible population (4.9 per
cent of the original spells file). The eligible population based on these merged
partner/main claimant files contained 337,034 spells.
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Total eligible population
Based on the three subpopulations of partners of JSA, IS and IB/SDA claimants, the
eligible population for all areas between May 1999 and January 2005 contains
3,242,545 spells, originating from
1,471,592 JSA spells (45.4 per cent)
1,433,919 IS spells (44.2 per cent)
330,174 IB spells (10.2 per cent)
6,860 SDA spells (0.2 per cent)
Merged WFIP Eligible Population/WFIP Participants (December 2004)
The eligible population was merged with the 2004 participants data for WFIP using
main claimant NINO and partner NINO. This merged file is the basis for the majority
of the analysis carried out in this evaluation. The merged data resulted in the
following numbers:
Merged rows 218,877
Eligible pop data not matched 3,023,670
WFIP Participants not matched  6,924
Total 3,249,471
The 218,877 merged records include multiple GMS partner spells (i.e. multiple
benefits) for the same couple matched to a single WFIP participant records.
Although the WFIP participants data should contain all participants until the end of
December 2004, DWP advice was to select and evaluate only participants until the
end of September 2004 as the participation data might be incomplete for later
dates.
2.1.3 Identifying eligible partners
The merged WASD/partner GMS data should allow the identification of the eligible
population in the period after WFIP was introduced. There are several important
factors determining eligibility and not all merged WASD/partners spells are eligible.
This sub-section shows how the eligible population was identified and provides
some checks whether it is possible to accurately identify the eligible population as
reported in the WFIP participant data using WASD.
A partner becomes eligible for a WFIP when the main claimant’s benefit spell
exceeds six months duration. Where a new partnership is formed and the claimant
has already passed the six-month threshold, the partner becomes immediately
eligible for WFIP. In such cases, the start date of the partnership is the start date of
eligibility. Since the merged WASD/partner GMS data contain the beginning and
ending dates of a benefit payment for the main claimant as well as ‘effective from’
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and ‘effective to’ dates of the partnership4, it should be possible to identify the date
of eligibility of the partner.
An important distinction is between the stock of eligible couples that existed at the
time of the WFIP introduction and the flow of couples who became eligible at some
later point. For those offices that integrated into the Jobcentre Plus network after
12 April 2004 – ‘go-live day’, the date when WFIP was introduced in Jobcentre Plus
areas – the date of WFIP introduction is the same as the date of Jobcentre Plus
integration. In principle, the stock should be measured with reference to this date.
However, as discussed later in this chapter, accurate information on the timing of
Jobcentre Plus integration was not available, so the analysis of the stock focused on
the original stock – that which existed on go-live day. The implication of this is that
all stock cases are characterised by a spell that has been ongoing for 182 days at the
time of go-live day. In other words, the spell must have commenced by 13 October
2003.
Within these two broad groupings – stock and flow – there are a number of possible
characterisations. This is shown schematically in Figure 2.1. This shows six types of
eligibility. In each case, two lines appear. The upper line represents the duration of
the benefit spell and the lower line represents the duration of the partnership. The
time at which eligibility commences is shown by a circle.
The first three cases shown are stock customers since they all have a spell that was
ongoing on 13 October 2003:
• in the first case (Type I), the partnership has also been in place for at least six
months so eligibility for WFIP begins on go-live day;
• in the second case (Type II), the partnership started less than six months before
go-live day. However, since it is the length of the benefit spell that determines
eligibility, this again begins on go-live day;
• in the third case (Type III), the partnership begins after go-live day. The partner
becomes immediately eligible for WFIP and therefore eligibility begins at the
time the partnership begins.
The next three cases shown are flow customers since they all have a spell that began
within six months of go-live day (that is, after 13 October 2003):
• in the fourth case (Type IV), the partnership has lasted as long as the benefit
spell (in fact, it could have even lasted longer). Eligibility begins when the spell
reaches the six month threshold. This will be some time after go-live day.
• in the fifth case (Type V), the benefit spell has not reached six months duration
at the time of go-live day and the partnership starts at some point within the first
six months of the benefit spell. Since it is the length of the benefit spell that
confers eligibility, this begins when the spell reaches the six month threshold.
4 Based on the scan of the GMS record (first and last appearance of the partnership
information).
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• in the sixth case (Type VI), the benefit spell has not reached six months duration
at the time of go-live day and the partnership starts at some point after the
benefit spell has already reached six months. In this case, eligibility begins
immediately the partnership is formed.
Figure 2.1 WFIP eligible population data: eligibility and date of
eligibility
It is important to note at this stage that, while the discussion so far has referred to
‘eligibility’, this should more properly be referred to as ‘pseudo-eligibility’. The
reason for this is that true eligibility applies only to those living in Jobcentre Plus
areas. For the purposes of modelling, it is necessary to know those truly eligible and
those in non-Jobcentre Plus areas who are pseudo-eligible; that is, their characteristics
would make them eligible if they lived in Jobcentre Plus areas. This latter group forms
the comparison group in the modelling results presented later in this report.
2.1.4 Duration of benefit and partnership
The problem of identifying the correct duration
In order to identify the eligible WFIP partners, it is required to correctly observe the
duration of the main claimant’s benefit spell. This is not possible using WASD since
the end date of a spell is always imputed; as already mentioned, if a person
disappears from the benefit register between two scans, the record will be closed
and a random end date assigned between the dates of the two scans. Therefore, any
duration calculated on the basis of WASD data is imprecise. As the end dates are
assigned at random, average duration should not be biased; however it will not be
possible to identify all eligible partners as reported in the participation data based on
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WASD as some might show durations of less than six months because of imputed
end dates.
The duration of a partnership
In many cases, the WASD main claimant’s benefit spell does not correspond to start
and end dates of the partnership drawn from the GMS partner spells on benefit. In
particular, the end dates in GMS may be long after WASD records the spell as having
ended. This cannot be explained by the imputation procedure since it can exceed the
two or six week gaps between scans. As the duration of partnership is not imputed
and a GMS partner record might indicate that a benefit claim is ongoing, we use the
end date of the partnership to replace the imputed ending date of the main
claimant’s benefit spell from WASD.
Figure 2.2 shows how correcting the duration of a benefit spell based on the GMS
partnership dates works in practice. Three scenarios are depicted. In each case, the
duration of the partnership as recorded in GMS is shown as the top line, the duration
of the benefit as recorded in WASD is shown as the middle line and the duration of
the benefit spell adjusted to take account of the partnership information is shown as
the bottom line. The approach taken is that, if a partnership is active six months after
the beginning date of the benefit spell or starts later than this, the date of WFIP
eligibility is either the beginning of the benefit payment plus six months or the
beginning of the partnership, even if the WASD data suggests that a benefit
payment ended.
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Figure 2.2 WFIP eligible population data: correction of ending dates
2.1.5 Eligible population and WFIP participants compared
This sub-section compares the eligible population as identified using WASD with the
partners identified in the WFIP participants data.
Table 2.1 shows the size of the pseudo-eligible population for all areas, irrespective
of whether integrated into the Jobcentre Plus network. The data are related to
persons rather than to customer records and, for customers who are eligible on the
basis of more than one benefit claimed, only the first such eligible spell is considered.
Based on this restriction, there are 465,638 eligible partners for both stock and flow
for the period between 12 April 2004 and 30 September 2004. As previously
indicated, eligibility was identified based on the duration of benefit and partnership.
A spell was considered ineligible if the main claimant’s age or the partner’s age was
60+. Eligible cases with a date of eligibility later than 30 September 2004 were
excluded since data were only complete up to this date.
This restriction to the first eligible spell in the period after the introduction of WFIP
reduces the total number of spells from the WASD data to 2,192,160 participants.
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Table 2.1 WFIP eligible partners, Jobcentre Plus and non-Jobcentre
Plus areas
Frequency Per cent
Valid
Not eligible 1,726,522 78.8
Type I: eligible stock 393,032 17.9
Type II: eligible stock 1,167 .1
Type III: eligible stock 8,321 .4
Type IV: eligible flow 43,415 2.0
Type V: eligible flow 16,892 .8
Type VI: eligible flow 2,811 .1
Total 2,192,160 100.0
Source: Merged partner/WASD data – WFI eligible population until 30 September 2004.
Using merged WFIP Eligible Population/WFIP Participants data, the eligible population
identified using WASD can be compared with all identified participants from the
WFIP participation data to confirm that the WASD data is sufficient for the
identification of the eligible population. To do this, we examine whether partners in
the participants data are identified as eligible using the WASD data only.
For the period up until 30 September 2004, the participants data contain records for
121,450 partners. 99,750 are partners from the stock of claimants, 22,059 are
partners of flow claimants who become eligible after 12 April 2004. However, 11.5
per cent are not identified for a WFIP (N=14,019). The remaining 107,431 cases
have been identified to be eligible for WFIP by the end September (Table 2.2)
Table 2.2  WFIP participants
Frequency Per cent
Not identified for WFIP 14,019 .6
Identified for WFIP 107,431 4.9
Total 121,450 5.5
Source: Merged partner/WASD data/WFI participation data until 30 September 2004.
Based on partners identified as eligible for a WFIP until 30 September 2004, Table 2.
3 describes whether these cases were eligible according to the rules applied to the
WASD eligible population data. Although the identification of eligible partners
requires a lot of assumptions, almost all partners found in the participant data were
also found to be eligible when using WASD. Based on the WASD data, 106,402
(= 98.8 per cent) were eligible according to the WASD data (Table 2.3). For
1.2 per cent of all participants, the WASD data did not allow accurate identification.
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Table 2.3 WFIP participants and status of eligibility
Eligibility for WFIP based on WASD Frequency Per cent
Ineligible based on WASD data 1,334 1.2
Type I: eligible stock 93,906 87.4
Type II: eligible stock 204 .2
Type III: eligible stock 1,035 1.0
Type IV: eligible flow 8,026 7.5
Type V: eligible flow 2,667 2.5
Type VI: eligible flow 259 .2
Total 107,431 100.0
Source: Merged partner/WASD data/WFI participation data until 30 September 2004.
As a result of this comparison, it appears that WASD data can adequately identify
(pseudo) eligibility.
2.1.6 Identifying treatment and control groups in WASD data
As described in Chapter 1, the introduction of WFIP was restricted to Jobcentre Plus
areas. Partners of benefit claimants in areas not operating Jobcentre Plus are not
eligible for WFIP and therefore offer a comparison group against which to assess the
effectiveness of WFIP. This is considered in more detail in Chapter 3. However, these
non-Jobcentre Plus areas are scheduled to integrate into the Jobcentre Plus network
by 2006. Consequently, partners in these areas will gradually become eligible. While
the comparison areas allow the identification of the effect of WFIP, consideration of
long-term outcomes is hampered by the inevitable erosion of the comparison
group.
In principle, it should be easy to identify the areas covered by Jobcentre Plus at any
date following the introduction of WFIP using postcode information. DWP provided
a look-up table that links postcodes with specific Jobcentre Plus areas. Furthermore,
information on the timing of offices’ integration into the Jobcentre Plus network
was provided:
• the look-up table contained 21,855 different postcodes. These postcodes were
either given in full or were given at the area level, such as AB12;
• the look-up table provided explicit links of postcodes to Jobcentre Plus offices
and showed the date these offices integrated into the Jobcentre Plus network;
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• the postcode-Jobcentre Plus correspondence should allow the identification of
the eligible population living in Jobcentre Plus areas until the end of 2004.
However, as the information was not consistently aggregated for all areas, it
was decided not to use the full postcodes, but to use sectors whenever full
postcodes were provided:
– where the postcode was given in full (e.g. AA1 1AA), all postcodes with the
same first digit of the suffix were used (e.g. AA1 1**);
– where only the postcode area was provided (e.g. AA1), all postcodes in that
area were used (that is, all postcodes beginning with AA1 were used).
Place of residence at date of eligibility for WFIP
The postcode information was valid for most records in the eligible population (only
very few cases were missing – around 6,000). However, this information relates to
the start or the end of a claim. The postcode at the time of WFIP eligibility – which
might be long after the beginning date of the main claimants benefit payment - is
not necessarily known. Consequently, the WASD data did not allow identification of
whether a person was resident in Jobcentre Plus or non-Jobcentre Plus areas at the
time of eligibility without making a further assumption. The approach that was
taken (following a suggestion from DWP) was to use the postcode relating to either
the start of the spell or the end of the spell, depending on which was closer to go-live
day or the date of eligibility.
Additional postcodes
The participants database also included postcodes. Since WFIP only exists in
Jobcentre Plus areas, this could provide a check on the extent to which the postcode
information from WASD was sufficient to distinguish Jobcentre Plus and non-
Jobcentre Plus. Table 2.4 shows the result of this comparison. In 11.9 per cent of
cases, the postcode in WASD – used in conjunction with the postcode look-up table
– suggested that those participants observed in the participants database were
ineligible. This was made up of:
• 10,969 cases where the postcode look-up table suggested the partner was not
in a Jobcentre Plus area
• 1,334 cases where the WASD data did not indicate eligibility
• 519 cases where the date of Jobcentre Plus integration was later than the end of
an individual’s eligibility.
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Table 2.4 WFIP participants and treatment status
Jobcentre Plus district and eligibility for WFIP Frequency Per cent
Non-Jobcentre Plus or ineligible based on WASD data 12,822 11.9
Jobcentre Plus eligible type I 83,762 78.0
Jobcentre Plus eligible type II 179 .2
Jobcentre Plus eligible type III 918 .9
Jobcentre Plus eligible type IV 7,112 6.6
Jobcentre Plus eligible type V 2,397 2.2
Jobcentre Plus eligible type VI 241 .2
Total 107,431 100.0
Source: Merged partner/WASD data/WFI participation data until 30 September 2004
From this cross-validation, it appeared that the postcode look-up table and the
information provided on the timing of offices’ integration into the Jobcentre Plus
network were both subject to some degree of error:
• the WFIP participation data included additional postcodes/postcode areas
• a number of participants were identified as eligible for WFI, but coming from
Jobcentre Plus offices that were missing in the look-up table.
Therefore, the look-up table was improved by including additional postcodes and
Jobcentre Plus areas found for the participants in the merged data using the
following rules:
• if postcodes with prefixes and/or first digits of suffixes appeared at least twice in
the participants’ data but did not appear in the postcode look-up table, the
related jobcentre was considered integrated into Jobcentre Plus
• the office most often corresponding to ‘similar’ postcodes (that is, postcodes
sharing a common prefix and first digit of the suffix, such as AA1 1**) was
taken as covering all such postcodes
• if no sufficient information was found about the date of Jobcentre Plus integration,
the first date of download for a specific Jobcentre Plus office observed in the
participants data was used
• wherever there was a first download recorded in the participants’ data for a
particular Jobcentre Plus office before the time of Jobcentre Plus integration
given in the look-up table, the same rule was applied.
As a result of these refinements, the number of identified participants (from the
participants data) for which no residence in a Jobcentre Plus area was found using
WASD data is reduced from 10,969 to 3,298. As before, for 1,334 partners, the
WASD data did not indicate that these persons were eligible for WFIP. Finally, there
were 885 cases where the Jobcentre Plus roll-out was after the end of an individual’s
eligibility, so that the total number of cases that could not be identified as eligible for
WFIP using WASD data fell to 5,517 (see Table 2.5).
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Table 2.5 WFIP participants and treatment status (additional
postcodes)
Jobcentre Plus district and eligibility for WFIP Frequency Per cent
Non-Jobcentre Plus or ineligible based on WASD data 5,517 5.1
Jobcentre Plus eligible type I 90,278 84.0
Jobcentre Plus eligible type II 198 .2
Jobcentre Plus eligible type III 978 .9
Jobcentre Plus eligible type IV 7,660 7.1
Jobcentre Plus eligible type V 2,551 2.4
Jobcentre Plus eligible type VI 249 .2
Total 107,431 100.0
Source: Merged partner/WASD data/WFI participation data until 30 September 2004
Partners eligible for WFIP and identified participants
The improved postcode/Jobcentre Plus correspondence table was used for the
identification of the treatment and control groups in the WASD data. Doing so, the
WASD data showed whether a partner included in the WASD data was eligible
based on the benefit and partnership duration and whether this person was:
• resident in a Jobcentre Plus area
• resident in an area for which the Jobcentre Plus integration date was known
• resident in an area for which the Jobcentre Plus integration date was unknown.
Based on this information, eligible and pseudo-eligible customers can be distinguished
as required for the design of the DiD estimates. To recap, the pseudo-eligible group
are eligible apart from the fact that they live in a non-Jobcentre Plus area. Of those
who were eligible in a Jobcentre Plus area, all should appear in the participants’
database. However, even after applying all the rules described in this section,
between 52 per cent and 55 per cent of all those identified as eligible in Jobcentre
Plus areas did not appear in the participants’ data. Hence, it seems that the WASD
data overstate the size of the eligible population. This will be addressed in the
estimates later in this report.
Table 2.6 WFIP eligible partners in Jobcentre Plus areas and identified
partners
Eligible partners in Jobcentre Plus areas and Frequency Percent
status in the participants data
Not identified for WFIP 8,335 3.4
Identified for WFIP 101,914 41.2
Total 110,249 44.6
Missing in participants data 137,170 55.4
Total 247,419 100.0
Source: Merged partner/WASD data/WFI participation data until 30 September 2004, based on
improved postcode-Jobcentre Plus match
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2.2 Constructing a database for the instrumental variables
analysis
In addition to the eligible population database, the WFIP participants database was
also used to produce estimates of the effect of WFIP for the original stock (that is, the
stock that existed at the time of go-live day). These estimates were produced using
a different approach – IV estimation – that is described in Chapter 3. The purpose of
this section is to describe the steps taken to construct the database used for this.
The reason why the IV estimation is based on the participants database is that it
exploits a key aspect of the data that only applies to those in the participants’ data.
This is described more fully below.
Unlike the flow cases for which participation in WFIP is prioritised, Jobcentre Plus
offices have up to three years before all their stock cases must have participated in a
WFIP. This is for capacity reasons since the numbers of stock cases at go-live day was
such that interviewing all of them would amount to a considerable task. Importantly,
there was a further complication. Namely, an essential prerequisite for administering
a WFIP to a partner was that that partner’s details be on LMS. Again, there was a
capacity issue in that the available IT window meant that this download had to be
staggered over a number of weeks.
This is very helpful to the evaluation since it was decided that the ordering of the
download would be carried out on a purely random basis. This was achieved by
using the last three digits of the main claimants’ National Insurance number. These
three digits are random and this property has been exploited in the past for other
evaluations such as the evaluation of Restart (White and Lakey, 1992). Organising
the download in this way was desirable since it allowed the useful possibility for a
very robust evaluation of the effect of WFIP as described in Chapter 3.
The database used for this analysis is based on the datasets of participants in WFIP
and NDP supplied by DWP in July 2005 and covering outcomes up until the end of
May 2005. Again, extensive manipulation of the data was required before they were
ready to use for evaluation purposes. This is described in the following sub-sections.
2.2.1 WFIP participants data
There were 174,794 spells recorded in the WFIP participants database. In a small
number of cases a single ORCID5 corresponded to multiple National Insurance
numbers (this was true for both the partners and the main claimants). Such couples
were removed, reducing the number of spells to 174,733. For the purposes of
analysis, we are only interested in the original stock (i.e. the stock that existed at
5 ORCID is the identifier variable common to many DWP benefit databases. It
should uniquely identify individuals so the fact that it seemed to correspond to
more than one National Insurance number in some cases is indicative of problem
records. However, the extent of this is very small.
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go-live day). The key reason for this is that the scale of the original stock was such
that the download to LMS had to be staggered (as described above) resulting in the
timing of download being determined by the claimants’ National Insurance number.
As this stock cleared, new stock arising from the roll-out of Jobcentre Plus to new
areas was of a small enough scale that a staggered approach was not needed.
As described in the previous section, identification of the original stock was
complicated by the lack of accurate information on the date of Jobcentre Plus
integration for a particular office. The same approach was followed to try and
reduce the effect of this. That is, the fact that case download is only possible in
integrated offices was used to refine the recorded integration date by changing it to
the date of first observed download within a particular office. In a large number of
cases, this resulted in the date of integration being set to 17 April 2004. This is the
Saturday after go-live day and represents the first bulk download of cases to LMS.6
What appears to have been happening in many cases is that there was no
information on integration date (possibly because the integration took place a long
time ago) so the imputation process simply captures the fact that the offices were
already integrated at go-live day (as evidenced by the fact that the download of
cases was able to proceed immediately).7
In line with this reasoning, couples in offices that were estimated to have integrated
after 17 April 2004 were excluded. This reduced the number of spells to 147,835.
Dropping those spells with an unknown start date reduced the number of spells to
139,833. Dropping duplicate spells reduced the number of spells to 139,302 and
omitting those couples who had no spell live at the time of go-live day reduced it
further to 124,846. Since we are interested only in stock couples, we exclude those
whose spells are not of sufficient duration at go-live day or who are recorded in the
administrative records as not being stock cases. This reduces the sample size to
102,986 couples. Some final minor manipulations reduced the number of couples
further:
• in 206 cases, the type of benefit as recorded by GMS differed from that recorded
by LMS
• in 54 cases, the age of the partner at go-live day was outside the 16-59 range
• in one case, the download date was before go-live day.
Excluding these cases resulted in a dataset of size 102,725.
6 Downloads were very heavily concentrated on Saturdays (84 per cent of all
downloads in the final dataset). There were only two notable exceptions to this
when the download took place on a Sunday instead (9 May 2004 and 8 August
2004).
7 In fact, two-thirds of these couples had a missing date of Jobcentre Plus
integration. For the remaining third, the fact that they were downloaded so
soon is also strongly suggestive of the fact that they represent ‘original’ stock.
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2.2.2 NDP participants data
There were 26,091 spells recorded in the New Deal for Partners (NDP) participants’
database. This fell to 26,081 after removing those couples where the partner’s
ORCID corresponded to multiple NINOs (it was not possible to do this for the main
claimant since the main claimant NINO was often missing).
This database includes both participants in the pre-go-live day NDP and participants
in the post-go-live day (i.e. enhanced) NDP. The first stage in preparing the data for
analysis was to select only those cases relating to re-vamped NDP. Following
guidance provided by DWP, only cases where any post-go-live day NDP variables
had been set were retained. Dropping these 14,697 cases resulted in a reduction of
the dataset to 11,384 spells. In 113 cases, a couple was observed to have two NDP
records. Only the first such case was considered. The result of these manipulations
was a dataset of 11,271 couples.
2.2.3 Merging WFIP and NDP participants data
The WFIP and NDP datasets were merged to identify those WFIP participants who
participated also in NDP. There were 7,859 couples in the NDP database who were
not present in the WFIP database. These couples were dropped.8 The resulting
merged dataset comprised 102,725 couples (the same size as the final WFIP
dataset).
2.2.4 Selecting only those conforming to the random download
design
Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of National Insurance numbers (in fact, the last
three digits of the National Insurance numbers) for all individuals downloaded in a
particular weekly slot. It is clear that the majority of those downloaded in a week
have a National Insurance number that falls within a well-defined range and that this
range covers a lower section of the distribution of National Insurance numbers. To
concentrate on those couples for whom the timing of download appears to have
complied with the random design, we ignore any cases downloaded after 5 June
2004 and restrict our estimation sample by considering only those individuals
downloaded during the main weekly slot whose National Insurance number falls
within the non-overlapping range associated with their download date. The size of
the final sample is 60,355 cases.
8 Many of these couples are likely to be non-original stock.
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Figure 2.3 Last three digits of National Insurance number by date
of download in 2004
2.2.5 Incorporating HMRC data
HMRC data on the employment spells live at go-live day or starting after this time
were merged to the dataset described above. These were used to indicate whether
an individual was employed at a given point in time. Again, a considerable amount
of data cleaning was required. The list below details what steps were taken and how
many recorded spells were lost at each step. It should be noted that although the
number of spells in the resulting dataset is smaller as a result of this processing, this
is mainly due to combining spells and discarding spells that offer no information
beyond that captured by other recorded spells.
The process was as follows:
• all spells in the HMRC data corresponding to those partners in the estimation
dataset created by the process described in the previous section were identified.
This comprised 23,297 spells.
• 7,911 recorded spells were dropped since they were duplicates (same start and
end dates).
• 80 spells were dropped since they started and ended on the same day.
• 472 spells were dropped since they were recorded as ending one day later than
they started. Entering a date one day before the end date is a protocol followed
by those entering the data for closing a spell when the start date (and the year
of start) is unknown.
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• 294 spells were dropped because they had a missing end date.
• three spells were dropped because they had a start date later than their end
date.
• seven spells were dropped due to their start date being after the date of the
extract (i.e. when the data were recorded).
• Where two or more spells had the same known9 start date but in one case the
end date indicated that the spell was still open,10 only the open spell was retained
and the other spells were dropped. This resulted in the loss of 2,310 spells
• Where two or more spells had the same known start date but in one or more
cases the end date was unknown, the spells with the unknown ends were
dropped. This resulted in the loss of 26 spells
• Where two or more spells had the same known start date but different known
end dates, the shorter spells were dropped. This resulted in the loss of 10 spells
• An imputation approach was used to deal with the remaining unknown start
and end dates. For end dates, the approach was as follows, if the spell was:
- longer than a year and the date of the extract was known, the end date was
randomly imputed as some point between the start of the financial year and
the extract date11
- longer than a year and the date of the extract was not known, the end date
was randomly imputed as some point between the start and the end of the
financial year
- not longer than a year and the date of the extract was known, the end date
was randomly imputed as some point between the recorded start of the spell
and the extract date
- not longer than a year and the date of the extract was not known, the end
date was randomly imputed as some point between the recorded start of the
spell and the end of the financial year
For unknown start dates, the approach was, if the spell was:
- longer than a year, the start date was randomly imputed as some point between
the start and the end of the financial year
- not longer than a year, the start date was randomly imputed as some point
between the start of the financial year and the imputed end date.
9 In some cases, the start date is not known exactly and all that is known is that
the spell started in a particular financial year. Such cases are recorded as starting
on 6 April in the appropriate year. Similarly, some end dates are not known
exactly and all that is known is that the spell ended in a particular financial year.
Such cases are recorded as ending on 5 April in the appropriate year.
10 This is indicated by an ‘end date’ of 29 December 9999.
11 Imputations were uniformly distributed throughout the relevant range of dates.
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Out of 14,350 spells, 940 had the end date imputed and 2,796 had the start
date imputed. This should not affect later evaluation results since the imputation
process used a randomly generated number that is not correlated with treatment
status.
• If a partner had a spell which was still open, all later spells for that individual
were dropped. This dropped 4,006 spells.
• Where a spell fitted wholly within another spell, it was dropped. There were 41
such spells.
• Where spells overlapped, they were merged into a single spell. There were 313
cases of spells being merged in this way.
• Similarly, where spells were separated by a single day or by a weekend they
were merged. There were 113 cases of spells being merged in this way.
At the end of this process, there were 7,711 employment spells remaining in the
dataset, corresponding to 7,519 couples. These employment spells were merged
onto the dataset described in the previous section (N=60,355).
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3 Evaluation method
Introduction and summary of main points
In this chapter, the evaluation approach is described. The fundamental
evaluation problem is that it is not possible to observe what would have
happened to those participating in, say, Work Focused Interviews for Partners
(WFIP) if they had not in fact participated. Two alternative strategies are used
to estimate the effects:
• Difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates are based on a comparison of
changes before and after the introduction of the intervention among those
eligible to participate (the treatment group) with similar changes among
those not eligible to participate (the comparison group).
- Varying the definition of the treatment and comparison group allows
the separate effects of WFIP and New Deal for Partners (NDP) and the
combined WFIP/NDP effects to be identified.
- In view of the difficulty in accurately predicting the eligible population
using Working Age Statistical Database (WASD) data (as described in
Chapter 2), the results are adjusted to provide estimates of the effects of
participation as well as the effects of eligibility.
• Instrumental variables estimates exploit the fact that there is a variable that
affects the probability of participating in, say, WFIP but does not affect
outcomes. Since participation is therefore determined in part by a factor
that is random as far as the outcome is concerned, this allows the impact of
participation to be identified for a subgroup of participants. Because of the
nature of the instrumental variable in this application, the effect is likely to
hold for all participants.
3.1 The evaluation problem
Before discussing the approach in detail, we first attempt to provide an intuitive
account of the evaluation problem. This is perhaps best done by considering the
obvious approach to the evaluation which would be to compare the outcomes of
those eligible for WFIP to the outcomes of those who are not eligible. While this has
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a simple appeal, it is flawed since those eligible may differ from those ineligible such
that one would expect their outcomes to differ even if WFIP did not exist. This is the
fundamental evaluation problem. The approach set out in this chapter amounts to a
strategy for overcoming this selection bias.
If we can observe all those factors which differ between the eligibles and the
ineligibles and which are important in determining labour market success, we could
take these into account using regression models or matching approaches. However,
with the data available for this analysis, it is not likely that all such features will be
captured. In other words, systematic differences between the eligibles and the
ineligibles will remain. In view of this, alternative approaches are needed. The central
challenge is to identify a reasonable estimate of what would have happened in the
absence of WFIP – the so-called counterfactual.
Most of the results presented in this report use the DiD method. However, some
modifications to this approach were required because of problems with the data –
these are discussed as well. The other approach used is the instrumental variables
(IV) approach. This is also discussed.
3.2 Difference-in differences
The basic idea behind DiD in this application is to compare outcomes of those
eligible for WFIP (the ‘treatment’ group) before its introduction with outcomes after
its introduction.12 These changes might be movements from unemployment to
employment, for instance. However, a simple ‘before-after’ comparison like this can
be misleading. If other factors – seasonality, for example, or changes in the overall
economy making it more or less likely to find work – could have affected the
comparison, the specific effect of WFIP cannot be separately identified by this
method.
To address this, we need an estimate of the counterfactual. This can be achieved by
considering a group ineligible for WFIP and therefore not affected by it. A before-
after comparison for this ‘comparison’ group can be used to proxy the ‘no WFIP’
scenario for those in the first group. This can be used to adjust the first before-after
comparison such that the effect it captures can be attributed solely to WFIP. This is
achieved by taking the difference between the two before-after differences. For
obvious reasons, the resulting estimator is known as the DiD estimator.
An example may serve to clarify. Table 3.1 presents some hypothetical figures on job
entry. The ‘before’ column indicates that, prior to the intervention, 35 per cent of
those in the treatment group would have found work within a given period of time.
The ‘after’ column shows that this rose to a level of 55 per cent over the same period
after the intervention. The resulting before-after comparison reports an increase of
12 A formal presentation of the model and modifications to it is given in Dorsett
(2005).
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20 percentage points. Repeating this for the comparison group yields a before-after
estimate of five percentage points. This can be viewed as the increase that the
treatment group would have experienced had the intervention not taken place. To
arrive at an estimate of the specific effect on the treatment group of the intervention
itself, this second difference needs to be deducted. Doing so results in the DiD
estimator of 15 percentage points. The key assumption in this is that whatever
external factors caused the five percentage point increase in the control group
would, in the absence of WFIP, have led to a similar rise in the treatment group.
Table 3.1 An illustration of the difference-in-differences estimator
Before (B) After (A) Difference (A-B)
Treatment 35 55 20
Control 40 45 5
Difference in differences estimate: 15
In practice, these estimates are achieved in a regression framework which allows for
the effect of other variables to be controlled for and therefore to identify the WFIP
effect more precisely. It also allows the statistical significance of the estimates to be
observed. However, this does not detract at all from the interpretation of the results
as set out above. The parameter estimated is the average effect of the treatment on
the treated.13
3.2.1 The assumptions underpinning DiD
DiD is a widely-used evaluation technique and is an attractive approach, particularly
when the use of administrative data means that the information set is insufficiently
rich to justify the use of possible alternative approaches. However, the plausibility of
its underlying assumptions should be considered. The DiD estimator relies on the
composition of the samples in the periods ‘before’ and ‘after’ periods remaining
unchanged. If individuals can choose not to experience the intervention, this might
have an effect on the accuracy of the DiD estimator, as particular factors may lead
some individuals to be more likely to opt-out than others. Should these self-
absenting individuals be different with regard to characteristics likely to affect
outcomes, a bias in the achieved DiD estimate can result. In the case of WFIP, this
seems unlikely to be a problem since participation is not particularly onerous and so
should present little incentive for avoidance. In fact, it is only when considering flow
cases that this could possibly be a problem; for stock cases, the full eligible
population is observed so any changes to the composition of the sample arising from
behavioural changes to avoid participation will be captured as a legitimate outcome.
13 This description relates to the standard exposition of the DiD model. In the
current application, not all of those in the treatment group actually receive the
treatment. In this case, the parameter identified is the average effect of intention
to treat on the eligible group.
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Another assumption is that the before-after estimate for the comparison group is
the same as would have been estimated for the treatment group had the treatment
not been introduced. Some insight into the plausibility of this assumption of
common trends can be achieved through pre-programme tests (Heckman and Hotz,
1987). This involves estimating effects based on two periods of time that wholly pre-
date the treatment. If the treatment and comparison groups are affected equally by
general economic conditions and other influences, such estimates should be
insignificant. If they are not, it suggests that using DiD to evaluate treatment effects
will result in biased estimates. In this case, a modification to the standard DiD
framework is needed. One possibility is to use the random growth model (Heckman
and Hotz, 1987). This operates by regarding the results of the pre-programme tests
as estimates of the bias resulting from the inappropriateness of the comparison
group. Essentially, the random growth model operates by subtracting the bias
revealed through the pre-programme tests from the treatment effect estimated
using DiD on the ‘before’ and ‘after’ periods. In this way, unbiased estimates can be
achieved.
3.2.2 Varying treatment and comparison groups to identify
different effects
The impact analysis is concerned with the effect of WFIP, the effect of NDP and the
effect of WFIP and NDP combined. By exploiting the eligibility criteria for WFIP and
NDP, it is possible to identify all three effects. This is expanded upon below.
When estimating the effect of WFIP, the treatment group is made up of all couples
eligible for WFIP. By definition, such couples must live in Jobcentre Plus areas since
WFIP cannot be implemented in areas that are not integrated into the Jobcentre Plus
network. Choosing as a comparison group those couples who would be eligible
apart from the fact that they live in non-Jobcentre Plus areas means that the only
change experienced by the treatment group but not by the comparison group is the
introduction of WFIP. Accordingly, this combination of treatment and comparison
group allows the effect of WFIP to be estimated. Since NDP is available regardless of
Jobcentre Plus integration, the introduction of NDP should affect those in the
treatment and comparison groups equally, so no net effect should be evident.
To get the combined effect of WFIP and NDP, the comparison group must not be
eligible for WFIP or NDP. The choice of comparison group was guided by this
requirement and also by the availability of data. Clearly, it is not possible to use
couples in receipt of benefit as a comparison group since the eligibility requirement
may not be satisfied. Instead, a comparison group of lone parents in Jobcentre Plus
areas was used; as well as being ineligible for WFIP and NDP by definition, it is also
possible the observe them in WASD. However, care is needed to ensure that other
interventions specific to lone parents do not reduce the extent to which trends in
benefit exit among lone parents can provide a counterfactual for couples. This is
especially relevant given the programme of WFIs for lone parents that has been
introduced and varied over the time period considered in this evaluation. To avoid
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the effects of WFIP being confused with the effects of Work Focused Interviews
(WFIs) for lone parents, a subsample of lone parents for whom the WFI regime had
remained unchanged over the time period considered in this evaluation was used to
construct the comparison group.
Finally, the effect of NDP alone can be estimated by repeating in non-Jobcentre Plus
areas the analysis described above to get the combined WFI/NDP effect. That is, the
treatment group is made up of couples eligible for NDP (but not WFIP since they are
outside Jobcentre Plus areas) and the comparison group is made up of lone parents
in the same areas.
3.3 Instrumental variables
The method of IV is another approach that is possible when a variable exists in the
data that influences the probability of receiving treatment but does not influence
the outcome of interest. Most common in empirical applications is for this variable –
the ‘instrument’ – to take one of two values: zero (indicating the absence of the
characteristic) or one (indicating the presence of the characteristic). Since the
instrument does not affect outcomes but does affect the probability of treatment,
comparing the mean outcome of that group of individuals for whom the instrument
takes the value one with the mean outcome for that group of individuals for whom
the instrument takes the value zero captures the effect of increased participation.
However, this is not sufficient to be viewed as a causal effect when the effects of
treatment are allowed to vary across individuals. To achieve such an interpretation,
the standard approach is to impose the assumption that the influence of the
instrument on treatment operates in just one direction. In other words, if the
instrument is thought to increase the probability of participation, nobody in the
group of individuals for whom the instrument takes the value one who does not
receive the treatment would be more likely to receive the treatment had they instead
had a zero value for the instrument. Imposing this assumption allows the difference
in outcomes to be viewed as causal in the same way as in an experiment.
To make these ideas more concrete, it is useful to see how they apply in this
evaluation. As described in Chapter 2, at go-live day there was a stock of eligible
couples whose records were downloaded to LMS over the following two months.
Importantly, the ordering of the download was completely random (based on the
National Insurance number) so that there was no systematic difference between the
characteristics of those who were downloaded early and those who were downloaded
later.14 This provides the basis for an excellent instrument. To see this, consider the
two conditions that an instrument must satisfy:
14 Note that the entire stock that existed at the time of WFIP introduction had their
records downloaded to LMS, regardless of whether they had left benefit in the
meantime.
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• First, it must be uncorrelated with the unobservable characteristics that affect
labour market outcomes. Since the National Insurance number is randomly
generated, this is automatically satisfied.
• Second, it must be correlated with participation. Evidence on this is provided in
Table 3.2. This shows a strong relationship between week of download and
probability of participating in WFIP for those downloaded in the first seven weeks.
Since this does not hold for those downloaded on 31/05/2004, these cases are
excluded from further analysis. In practice, this amount to dropping less than
half of one per cent of the sample.
To proceed, the instrument was defined as a variable as taking a value one for those
downloaded in the first four weeks after go-live day and zero for those downloaded
in the weeks after that.
Table 3.2 The proportion observed to have attended a WFI by date
of download
Date of download % attended WFI N
12/04/2004 37.59 9,910
19/04/2004 32.30 9,258
26/04/2004 27.29 9,074
03/05/2004 26.58 9,258
10/05/2004 21.79 9,132
17/05/2004 19.90 8,046
24/05/2004 19.16 5,448
31/05/2004 34.06 229
All 27.11 60,355
It is important to be clear on the nature of the effect identified using IV. For IV, the
estimated effects do not relate to the treated group as a whole. Rather, the effect
relates to those induced by the instrument to participate. In the literature, this group
of individuals is known as the compliers. In this evaluation, the compliers are those
who participated in WFIP because they were downloaded early and who would not
have participated in WFIP had they been downloaded later. The estimated effect is
known as the local average treatment effect because it is ‘local’ to the compliers.
The key question to consider in any IV evaluation is whether knowledge of the local
average treatment effect is actually useful. This hinges on the issue of whether the
group of people to whom the local average treatment effect relates is a policy-
relevant group. It is not possible to individually identify the compliers – those who
react to early download by participating in WFIP (and who would not participate if
downloaded later). However, since WFIP is a mandatory treatment, participation is
not a matter of individual choice. Furthermore, individuals can only be treated once
their records have been downloaded. So, an individual who is downloaded early is
likely to participate in a WFI before an individual who has been downloaded later for
Evaluation method
35
reasons that are uncorrelated with the individual’s personal characteristics. In view
of this, the participation ‘decision’ is random so the compliers are a random
subgroup of the eligible population. This means that there is no reason to believe
that the estimates provided by IV (the local average treatment effect) should differ
from the estimates provided by DiD (the ATET). In other words, due to the nature of
the instrument used in this evaluation, the IV estimates can be regarded as providing
an estimate of the average effect of the treatment on the treated.
3.4 Effects of eligibility versus effects of treatment
The DiD results were based on the WFIP Eligible Population database. As described
in Chapter 2, there were a number of couples in the data who appeared eligible for
WFIP on the basis of the known eligibility criteria but who were not recorded as
participants. The consequence of this is that the impact estimated through DiD is not
the effect of participation so much as the effect of eligibility.15
It is often more interesting to know the effect of participation rather than eligibility.
It is possible to derive such an estimate if the assumption is made that WFIP only has
any effect on those who participate. In this case, a standard result (Bloom, 1984)
allows the effect of eligibility to be used as the basis for the estimate of the effect of
participation. These results are presented later in this report. This Bloom adjustment
is straightforward to apply; the effect of participation is calculated as the effect of
eligibility divided by the proportion of the eligible population observed to participate.
However, it is important to consider whether the assumption that the effect
operates only through participants is reasonable. In particular, it is possible that
deterrent effects operate such that individuals are, for example, more likely to exit
benefit once they are contacted regarding the need to participate. If this is the case,
the estimated effects of participation provided by the Bloom adjustment will
essentially regard the deterrent effect as an effect of participation and consequently
represent an upper bound on the true effect of participation. The converse is not
true, however – the effect of eligibility does not represent a lower bound on the
effect of participation. To see this, consider the situation where there is a deterrent
effect but participation itself has no effect. In this case, the effect of eligibility will be
positive despite the effect of participation being zero. Hence, the effect of eligibility
does not represent a lower bound on the effect of participation.
15 This issue does not affect the IV estimates since they are based on the database
of WFIP participants.
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4 Descriptive analysis
Introduction and summary of main points
This chapter provides a description of the couples included in the datasets
used for the impact assessment. Administrative data only provide information
on a small number of characteristics – length of spell, age, gender, number of
children – so this description is not comprehensive. A detailed account of the
eligible population is available in Coleman et al. (2006).
Reflecting the structure of the impact analysis, couples identified using Working
Age Statistical Data (WASD) data as eligible for Work Focused Interviews for
Partners (WFIP) (that is, those couples used for the difference-in-differences
(DiD) estimates) are described first. The main findings are:
• about a quarter of spells were less than a year in duration but more than
half were at least three years long
• On average, WFIPs were booked for flow partners 30 days after becoming
eligible. For stock partners, the average was 123 days.
• In 38 per cent of stock cases and 34 per cent of flow cases, partners attending
a WFIP declined offers of further help. In five per cent of stock cases, the
WFIP destination was recorded as ‘into work’ or ‘partner working over 24
hours’. For the flow, this figure was eight per cent.
• New Deal for Partners (NDP) take up following WFIP was much more
common than self-referral. Of those NDP participants identified as eligible
for WFIP in the WASD data, only 15 per cent self-referred.
• The data available allows examination of outcomes up to 37 weeks after
becoming eligible for WFIP. By this time, about 88 per cent of stock couples
were still on benefit. For the flow, the proportion was much lower at 62 per
cent
• there were no obvious differences between Jobcentre Plus and non-
Jobcentre Plus areas in terms of characteristics or movement off benefit.
This provides some reassurance that the estimated effects of WFIP will apply
to areas yet to integrate into the Jobcentre Plus network.
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The participants database (that is, the database used for the instrumental
variables estimates) is used next to describe the characteristics of the stock
claimants in the estimation sample. The main findings are:
• The benefit received in more than three-quarters of all cases was Income
Support (IS). The remainder divided quite evenly between Jobseeker’s
Allowance (JSA) and Incapacity Benefit (IB). Spells on JSA tended to be
shorter than spells on IS or IB: 43 per cent of JSA spells were under a year in
duration at go-live day while 43 and 56 per cent respectively of IS and IB
spells were longer than five years.
• Dependent children were present in the households of 64 per cent of
partners and in about three-quarters of cases the youngest child was of
pre-secondary school age.
• The main over-representation of partners appeared to be in Scotland, Wales,
the North East and North West England.
• 72 per cent of those who remain on benefit will not have attended a Work
Focused Interview (WFI) within a year of their records being downloaded.
4.1 Describing the eligible population using WASD
4.1.1 Characteristics of treatment and control groups
Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 provides a summary of all eligible partners identified using
WASD data. To recap, between 12 April 2004 and 30 September 2004, a total of
465,638 partners would have been eligible if the programme had been introduced
nationwide. Most of these eligible partners would have been partners of stock
claimants that were already on benefit for more than six months at the date of
introduction of WFIP.
However, WFIP has only been introduced in Jobcentre Plus areas. Therefore, only
partners living in areas operating Jobcentre Plus are eligible. Table 2.6 in Chapter 2
showed that, in the period between 12 April 2004 and 30 September 2004, a total
of 247,419 partners of main claimants on either JSA, IS, IB or Severe Disablement
Allowance (SDA) were eligible according to the WASD data. As the roll-out of
Jobcentre Plus is ongoing, this number includes eligible partners living in areas that
integrate into the Jobcentre Plus network between April and September. A total of
101,419 eligible partners were identified in the participation data for WFIP.
For the DiD analysis, a distinction needs to be drawn between those areas in which
WFIP operates and those where it does not. Collectively, these area make up the
‘treatment’ group and the ‘comparison’ group respectively. As discussed in Chapter
3, the DiD estimates involve an assessment of average outcomes among those in the
treatment group measured against average outcomes among those in the comparison
group. To avoid issues associated with gradual roll-out of Jobcentre Plus, only those
areas that were already operating Jobcentre Plus on 12 April 2004 were included in
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the treatment group. For the comparison group, only areas in which a Jobcentre Plus
roll-out did not occur before the end September 2004 were included. Imposing
these restrictions reduces the number of eligible partners to 182,504, as shown in
Table 4.1 – a reduction of 64,915 or 26 per cent. The comparison group reduces to
a total of 210,909 partners.
In the following pages, we provide a short description of the samples used in the DiD
impact evaluation reported in Chapter 5. This description focuses on those
characteristics recorded in WASD. The comparisons show similarities and differences
between treatment and control groups and are important for generalising the
results of the impact analysis to the total group of eligible partners in the United
Kingdom.
Table 4.1 shows the main claimant’s type of benefit for eligible partners in
non-Jobcentre Plus and Jobcentre Plus areas. Note that this description is based on
the spell determining WFIP eligibility, which is the earliest spell if more than one
benefit claim is active simultaneously (e.g. IS and IB). The types of benefit claimed
were similar in both Jobcentre Plus and non-Jobcentre Plus areas. The benefit most
often claimed was IS (more than half of all cases). JSA and IB both accounted for a
little over a fifth of cases. Very few claimed SDA.
Table 4.1 Partners for WFIP by main claimant’s type of benefit, in
Jobcentre Plus and non-Jobcentre Plus areas
Main claimant’s WFIP eligible partners Total
type of benefit
Jobcentre Plus Non-Jobcentre Plus
JSA 22% 21% 22%
IS 56% 55% 55%
IB 22% 23% 22%
SDA 1% 1% 1%
Total 182,504 210,909 393,413
Table 4.2 shows the distribution of benefit duration for treatment (Jobcentre Plus)
and comparison (non-Jobcentre Plus) groups. Since eligibility requires a spell of at
least six months, there are no instances of shorter spells than that. Overall, the
durations were quite similar for those in Jobcentre Plus and non-Jobcentre Plus
areas. There is a clear concentration among those with shorter spells but those with
very long spells were also evident. To put this into context, about a quarter of all
claims were less than a year long but more than half were at least three years long
(51 per cent in Jobcentre Plus areas and 55 per cent in non-Jobcentre Plus areas).
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Table 4.2 Partners for WFIP by duration of claim, in Jobcentre Plus
and non-Jobcentre Plus areas
WFIP eligible partners Total
Duration of main
claimant on benefit Jobcentre Plus Non-Jobcentre Plus
6 months - 1 year 26% 24% 25%
1-2 years 13% 14% 14%
2-3 years 9% 9% 9%
3-4 years 7% 8% 7%
4-5 years 6% 6% 6%
5-6 years 5% 6% 5%
6-7 years 5% 5% 5%
7-8 years 4% 4% 4%
8-9 years 4% 4% 4%
9-10 years 9% 10% 10%
More than 10 years 11% 12% 11%
Base 182,504 210,909 393,413
Table 4.3 shows the gender distribution of main claimants related to eligible
partners in Jobcentre Plus and non-Jobcentre Plus areas. Again, there are hardly
differences between both areas. A share of 79 per cent of all main claimants in
Jobcentre Plus areas was male, compared to 80 per cent in non-Jobcentre Plus areas.
Correspondingly, 79 per cent of all partners were female in both areas and 21 per
cent of all eligible partners were male (Table 4.4).
Table 4.3 Partners for WFIP by main claimant’s gender, in
Jobcentre Plus and non-Jobcentre Plus areas
WFIP eligible partners Total
Main claimant’s gender Jobcentre Plus Non-Jobcentre Plus
Male 79% 80% 312,652
Female 21% 20% 80,743
Base 182,496 210,899 393,395
Table 4.4 Partners for WFIP by partner’s gender, in Jobcentre Plus
and non-Jobcentre Plus areas
Partner’s gender WFIP eligible partners Total
Jobcentre Plus Non-Jobcentre Plus
Male 21% 21% 79,438
Female 79% 79% 303,149
Total 177,511 205,076 382,587
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The presence of children in the household is likewise similar across treatment and
comparison groups. In more than half of all eligible households, children were
present. The full distribution is shown in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5 Partners for WFIP by number of children, in Jobcentre
Plus and non-Jobcentre Plus areas
Number of Children WFIP eligible partners Total
Jobcentre Plus Non-Jobcentre Plus
No children 43% 44% 170,236
One 20% 19% 76,566
Two 19% 18% 72,823
Three 10% 10% 40,424
Four and more 8% 9% 33,364
Total 182,504 210,909 393,413
Table 4.6 shows the distribution of the age of the main claimant. Only 15 per cent of
main claimants in Jobcentre Plus areas (14 per cent in non-Jobcentre Plus areas)
were below the age of 30. About a quarter of all main claimants were in the age
group 31-40, whereas around 30 per cent of the customers were older than 40
years. The share of main claimants in the range of 51-60 years of age was another 30
per cent. Customers older than 60 years are excluded as they were not eligible for
WFIP.
Table 4.6 Partners for WFIP by age of main claimant, in Jobcentre
Plus and non-Jobcentre Plus areas
Age of main claimant WFIP eligible partners Total
Jobcentre Plus Non-Jobcentre Plus
Below 20 years 2% 1% 6,070
20-30 years 13% 13% 49,504
31-40 years 26% 25% 99,611
41-50 years 30% 30% 118,111
51-60 years 30% 31% 120,117
Total 182,504 210,909 393,413
Table 4.7 shows the age of the partners with eligibility for WFIP. Overall, partners
appear younger than the main claimants. This is particularly evident when considering
the oldest age group; 21 per cent of those in Jobcentre Plus areas and 22 per cent in
non-Jobcentre Plus areas were aged 51-60, while about 30 per cent of main
claimants fell into this age group.
On the basis of the limited information available in the WASD data, the eligible
population in Jobcentre Plus areas appears very similar to the pseudo-eligible
population in the non-Jobcentre Plus areas. While it is of course possible that there
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are other differences between the two types of areas that are not captured by the
data, on the basis of the comparisons presented above, there is nothing to suggest
that the effects of WFIP in non-Jobcentre Plus areas should differ from the effects in
Jobcentre Plus areas presented in the next chapter. This is reassuring since it
suggests that the results of this evaluation may extend to other areas not currently
implementing WFIP.
Table 4.7 Partners for WFIP by age of partner, in Jobcentre Plus
and non-Jobcentre Plus areas
Age of partner WFIP eligible partners Total
Jobcentre Plus Non-Jobcentre Plus
missing 2% 2% 7,277
Below 20 years 3% 3% 11,149
20-30 years 16% 16% 64,251
31-40 years 27% 27% 107,482
41-50 years 30% 30% 118,402
51-60 years 21% 22% 84,852
Total 182,504 210,909 393,413
4.1.2 WFIP participation of eligible partners and outcomes
As shown in Chapter 2, fewer than half the partners identified using WASD as
eligible for WFIP were identified as actually participating in WFIP. Of the 210,909
eligible partners in the WASD data, we only found a total of 81,752 participants
identified in the WFIP participation data; 72,002 partners for stock claimants and
9,750 for the flow. The partners found in the WFIP participation data correspond to
39 per cent of all eligible partners identified based on the WASD data.
Stock
Table 4.8 presents a number of aspects of the WFIP process for stock couples, in
particular, the time it takes to progress through the system. This information is taken
from the participants’ data and covers the period up until 30 September 2004. By
this time, a total of 72,002 eligible partners were identified.
The average date of eligibility was the 12 April 2004, indicating that few partners
began a partnership after this date (resulting in immediate eligibility for WFIP). Such
partners have been previously defined as eligible partners of type III, (see Figure 2.1).
On average, it took 41 days from this point for their details to be downloaded to
LMS. By 30 September 2004, 18,579 stock partners had had a WFIP booked,
corresponding to 26 per cent of all downloaded partners. The date of booking was
on average 123 days after the date of eligibility, i.e. approximately four months after
12 April 2004.
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The table also shows that around a fifth (14,008) of all stock partners had attended
a WFIP by 30 September 2004. This usually took place around 16 days after the WFI
was booked. For those who attended the WFIP, the date of exiting WFIP and
destination upon exit is recorded. For partners recorded to have exited the
programme, the entire process from eligibility to exit takes 136 days on average.
Some (13,870) partners attended a WFIP. For them, exit was typically recorded as
following shortly afterwards (1.6 days on average). Nearly all partners who attended
the WFIP were recorded as exiting participation – very few do not show a valid
destination state. A comparison of the number of partners recorded for a booked
WFIP and the number actually attending shows that 75 per cent attended after the
booking.
Table 4.8 WFIP process for eligible population in Jobcentre Plus
areas, stock
N Mean
Date of eligibility 72,002 12-APR-2004
Number of days from eligibility to LMS download 72,002 41.3
Number of days from eligibility to WFIP booking 18,579 123.2
Number of days from WFI booking to WFIP attendance 14,008 16.5
Number of days from eligibility to WFIP exit 19,849 136.1
Number of days from WFI attendance to WFIP exit 13,870 1.6
Table 4.9 shows the destination on exiting WFIP. Overall, there are destinations
recorded for 19,847 partners, approximately 28 per cent of all identified participants
in Jobcentre Plus areas. As we observe more valid destination states from WFIP
participation than there are partners attending the WFIP, it seems there is a
substantial effect of the programme caused by the WFIP booking rather than
attendance. The most frequent outcome of the WFIP is however the attendance of
the interview resulting in no further activity as the partner refuses any support (38
per cent). Another 31 per cent of partners leave the programme with the destination
state ‘other reason’. Seven per cent agreed to participate in NDP as a result of their
WFIP. About five per cent leave for work-related reasons: 586 move into work and
for another 337 the reason recorded for their exit is that they work more than 24
hours a week. Eight per cent of all partners exit due to changes in circumstances:
either the partner refers to another benefit, they move to a non-Jobcentre Plus area
or entitlement ceases. In another five per cent of cases, the participation data
recorded that they had been incorrectly identified for WFIP.
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Table 4.9 Destination states as recorded in WFIP participants’ data,
stock
Frequency Percent of valid
destinations
Partner participated and has refused offers of support 7,546 38%
Other Reason 6,104 31%
NDP Agreed 1,411 7%
Incorrectly Identified for WFI(P) 985 5%
Partner referred to an alternative benefit 706 4%
Into Work 586 3%
Change of Client Group 558 3%
Change of Circumstances – Entitlement Ceased 511 3%
Set up in error 441 2%
Partner Working Over 24 Hours 337 2%
Customer Ends Claim – No Reason 198 1%
Destination Unknown 132 1%
Partner In Prison/Custody/On Trial 108 1%
Partner Left Jobcentre Plus area 67 0%
Partner Deceased 58 0%
Customer Deceased 54 0%
Partner Claimed Maternity Benefit 45 0%
Total 19,847 100%
Missing (% of total participants) 52,155 72%
Total stock participants 72,002
Note: because of rounding, small numbers may appear as zero when expressed as a percentage
of the total.
Flow
Tables 4.10 and 4.11 show corresponding WFIP participation for flow partners; that
is, partners of those whose claim reaches the six month threshold after 12 April
2004. Up until 30 September 2004, there were 9,750 participants recorded. The
date of eligibility as identified in WASD was on average 3 July 2004. In comparison
to the partners of stock claimants, the process of WFIP participation happens much
more quickly. This is in line with the priority attached to providing flow partners with
a WFIP. On average, flow partner details are downloaded to the WFIP participation
database 17 days after the date of eligibility and partners are booked for a WFIP 30
days after the date of eligibility (compared to 123 days for stock partners). 64 per
cent of all partners identified by 30 September 2004 had been booked for a WFIP
(6,280 participants, compared to 26 per cent of the stock claimants). About 47 per
cent of all identified participants had attended a WFIP (4,641), on average, 16 days
after the date when the WFIP was finally booked. Once booked for a WFIP, the
process is rather similar between partners of stock claimants and partners of flow
claimants; on average, 1.6 days after the attendance of the WFI, the record is closed
and the participant exits from the WFIP system.
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Table 4.10 WFIP process for eligible population in Jobcentre Plus
areas, flow
N Mean
Date of eligibility 9,750 03-JUL-2004
Number of days from eligibility to LMS download 9,750 17.5
Number of days from eligibility to WFIP booking 6,280 30.2
Number of days from WFI booking to WFIP attendance 4,641 16.5
Number of days from eligibility to WFIP exit 6,310 47.5
Number of days from WFI attendance to WFIP exit 4,589 1.6
As with stock partners, we find more recorded destination states among the
partners of flow claimants than there were partners attending the WFIP. 6,310
partners had exited the system by 30 September 2004 (64 per cent) compared to
4,641 partners attending the WFIP (47 per cent), again giving some indication that
exits from the programme can be caused by WFI bookings or even earlier, when
partners are contacted by the adviser. As before, most partners participated in the
WFIP and are recorded to have refused any further support from Jobcentre Plus (34
per cent refused such offers compared to 38 per cent for the stock). Again, a
substantial number exit the programme due to other known reasons that are not
observed in the data (30 per cent). About eight per cent leave for work-related
reasons (compared to five per cent of the partners of stock claimants): five per cent
move into work and three per cent the reason recorded for their exit is that they work
more than 24 hours a week. A further ten per cent agreed to begin NDP (compared
to seven per cent of the stock). Again, around eight per cent of all partners are
recorded to have left because of changes in circumstance (three per cent referred to
an alternative benefit, two per cent of the claims ended and in three per cent of all
cases, entitlement ceased).
Table 4.11 Destination states as recorded in WFIP participants’
data, flow
Frequency Per cent
Partner participated and has refused offers of support 2,169 34%
Other Reason 1,920 30%
NDP Agreed 634 10%
Into Work 291 5%
Incorrectly Identified for WFI(P) 288 5%
Partner referred to an alternative benefit 193 3%
Change of Circumstances – Entitlement Ceased 164 3%
Partner Working Over 24 Hours 159 3%
Set up in error 116 2%
Change of Client Group 103 2%
Customer Ends Claim – No Reason 102 2%
Partner In Prison/Custody/On Trial 54 1%
continued
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Table 4.11 Continued
Frequency Per cent
Destination Unknown 46 1%
Partner Claimed Maternity Benefit 35 1%
Partner Left Jobcentre Plus area 24 0%
Partner Deceased 7 0%
Customer Deceased 5 0%
Total 6,310 100%
Missing (% of total flow participants) 3,440 35%
Total flow participants 9,750 100.0
Note: because of rounding, small numbers may appear as zero when expressed as a percentage
of the total.
4.1.3 NDP participation of eligible partners
One key aim of WFIP is to encourage participation in NDP. Table 4.12 considers
those partners identified as eligible for WFIP in the participants’ database and shows
that those who have attended a WFIP are more likely to have started NDP than those
who have not. The table implies that 3.5 per cent of those who have attended a WFIP
are recorded as starting NDP compared to only 0.5 per cent of those who have not
attended a WFIP. Overall, 1.2 per cent of all eligible partners in Jobcentre Plus areas
are recorded as entering NDP.
Table 4.12 NDP caseload by WFIP attendance (after 12 April 2004,
Jobcentre Plus areas)
Status of WFIP attendance Total
No WFIP attended WFIP attended
Did not start NDP 62,797 17,991 80,788
Started NDP (caseload) 306 658 964
Total 63,103 18,649 81,752
4.1.4 Levels of claiming among eligible partners
This section describes the proportions of couples on benefits for specified weeks
after the date of their eligibility. Figures 4.1 – 4.3 show this outcome for the stock,
and Figures 4.4-4.6 have corresponding information for the flow16.
16 The numbers of participants are slightly below the number reported in the
descriptive statistics earlier, since partners were excluded from the samples if
they were showing missing values in observable characteristics that are later on
used in the impact analysis.
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Stock
For the stock, eligibility commences on 12 April 2004 if they are type I or type II stock,
i.e. a benefit claim of more than six months duration and an ADI for a dependent
partner recorded on 12 April 2004 (see Chapter 2 – pages 8 and 9 – for these
definitions). For type III stock, for whom the partnership begins after 12 April 2004,
the date of eligibility is the date of partnership start, i.e. later than 12 April 2004.
The WASD data provide information on benefit status up to the end of December
2004. However, following Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) advice, spells
beginning after September 2004 were not considered as they were likely to be
incomplete. All benefit spells following the date of eligibility were taken into
account when considering whether benefit was being claimed. With the WASD
data used in this evaluation, outcomes up to 37 weeks after the date of eligibility can
be observed. This covers the period between 12 April 2004 and 31 December 2004.
For those with the latest eligibility date (30 September 2004), outcomes are
observed for at least 14 weeks (the length of time between the end of September
and the end of December). Consequently, there are fewer couples observed for
longer periods after the date of their eligibility than are observed for shorter periods.
This is evident in the following charts. Figure 4.1 considers stock couples in
Jobcentre Plus and non-Jobcentre Plus areas. The bar chart shows the number of
cases that can be observed for the weeks following eligibility. The number of
observed cases declines for later weeks as partners becoming eligible after 12 April
2004 can only be observed for a part of this period. However, only type III claimants
do not provide outcomes for the whole period, and these are few in number.
Overall, there are still around 328,000 main claimants that can be observed for the
full duration of 37 weeks after the date of eligibility.
The line in Figure 4.1 shows the proportion of couples on benefits at different times
after eligibility begins. This proportion is 100 per cent at the date of eligibility, as
partners are only eligible if a spell is ongoing. Over the 37 week period observed, the
proportion falls to around 88 per cent.
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Figure 4.1 WFIP eligible population and main claimants’ benefit
rates (stock)
When restricting the sample to partners in Jobcentre Plus areas, we obtain the
outcome for the group eligible for WFIP. These are shown in Figure 4.2. Roughly
153,000 eligible stock partners in Jobcentre Plus areas are identified. Their benefit
outcomes differ only slightly from those observed for couples in both Jobcentre Plus
and non-Jobcentre Plus areas; after 37 weeks, the proportion on benefit stands at
87.5 per cent. The numbers of couples observable for the whole period is around
149,500; 4,000 are not observed for the whole post-treatment period because they
are type III stock.
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Figure 4.2 WFIP eligible population and proportion remaining on
benefit (stock, Jobcentre Plus areas)
Finally, Figure 4.3 shows the number of eligible partners that had attended a WFIP
before 30 September 2004. There are 14,500 such cases (again slightly more than in
Table 4.7 as there was no restriction on the date of the WFIP attendance). 13,804 of
these couples can be observed for the whole post-treatment period of 37 weeks,
and only 200 for a shorter period.
Levels of benefit receipt are higher for the subgroup of those attending a WFIP. After
37 weeks, 93 per cent were still claiming – five percentage points more than for the
total group of eligible partners. This is unsurprising when we take into account the
fact that WFIPs take place, on average, about 121 days after the date of eligibility.
Consequently, those who attend a WFIP will on average have a longer benefit spell
since those couples leaving benefit more quickly are excluded from this subgroup. In
fact, WFIP participants are on average 123 days longer on benefit.
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Figure 4.3 Recorded WFIP participants and proportion remaining on
benefit (stock, Jobcentre Plus areas)
Figures 4.4 to 4.6 summarise the equivalent results for the flow. As previously
defined, the flow is distinguished from the stock by the fact that the benefit exceeds
the six months threshold after 12 April 2004. For those in a partnership before this
point, eligibility begins when the six month threshold is reached. For those who form
a partnership at some point after the six month threshold, eligibility coincides with
the start of the partnership.
Figure 4.4 considers flow couples in both Jobcentre Plus and non-Jobcentre Plus
areas. Clearly the number of partners is much smaller than for the stock. In all areas,
there are only around 52,000 eligible flow partners between 12 April and
30 September 2004.17 The number of couples observed for longer periods of time
also declines more rapidly than for the stock since, by definition, flow claimants
become eligible after the 12 April 2004. This means that estimates of the proportion
still on benefit 37 weeks after eligibility is based on those relatively few cases for
whom eligibility began shortly after 12 April 2004; this is a very small subpopulation
of the eligible partners from the flow.
17 This figure is slightly smaller than the numbers reported in Table 2.1 since areas
that integrated into the JC+ network between 12 April 2004 and 31 December
2004 are excluded.
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The other striking result from Figure 4.4 is that there is a much higher rate of benefit
exit than is evident for the stock. After 37 weeks, the proportion claiming benefit
had fallen by about 40 percentage points.
Figure 4.4 WFIP eligible population and proportion remaining on
benefit (flow)
Figure 4.5 considers those in Jobcentre Plus areas only. The number of cases for
which longer term outcomes can be observed becomes very small. From the original
sample of 24,000 partners, only around 200 are observed for 37 weeks after the
start of eligibility. Despite this, the pattern of decline in the proportion claiming
benefits is similar to that seen when considering Jobcentre Plus and non-Jobcentre
Plus areas combined. After 37 weeks, about 62 per cent remained on benefit.
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Figure 4.5 WFIP eligible population and proportion remaining on
benefit (flow, Jobcentre Plus areas)
Figure 4.6 shows again that a restriction to the participants in WFIP selects a
subgroup of the eligible flow sample of partners in Jobcentre Plus areas with a higher
average duration on benefit. As before, this may be explained by the fact that the
WFIP process itself requires time and so those who participate in WFIP will have a
longer average benefit duration than those who do not. The estimates of the
proportion on benefit 37 weeks after eligibility begins is based on so few participants
(less than 100) that the observed increase at this time is not credible. Before this
point, about 70 per cent of couples were on benefit.
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Figure 4.6 Recorded WFIP participants and proportion remaining on
benefit (flow, Jobcentre Plus areas)
4.2 Describing the original stock using the participants
database
4.2.1 Characteristics of the stock
Table 4.13 below shows the benefits received by the household at the time of go-live
day. Most common was IS. This accounted for more than three-quarters of all
partners. JSA and IB accounted for roughly similar amounts while receipt of SDA was
rare. Combinations of benefits were also rare.
Table 4.13 Stock couples: which benefit(s) claimed
Benefit information Col %
JSA only 12.5
IS only 75.6
IB only 11.5
SDA only 0.2
IS and IB 0.1
IS and SDA 0.0
Base 60,355
Note: because of rounding, small numbers may appear as zero when expressed as a percentage
of the total.
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Spells on JSA tended to be shorter than spells on IS or IB: 43 per cent of JSA spells
were shorter than one year at the time of go-live day compared to nine and six per
cent of IS and IB respectively (Table 4.14). At the other extreme, only four per cent of
JSA spells had lasted longer than five years at go-live day compared to 43 and 56 per
cent respectively of IS and IB spells.
Table 4.14 Stock couples: duration of benefit spell (Column
percentages)
Benefit duration at go-live day JSA IS IB SDA All
6 months - 1 year 42.8 9.0 6.3 0.0 12.9
1-2 years 37.4 14.8 11.0 0.7 17.1
2-3 years 10.4 11.8 9.3 1.4 11.3
3-4 years 4.1 11.7 8.9 7.0 10.4
4-5 years 1.5 10.1 8.2 7.7 8.8
5-6 years 1.1 8.4 7.6 7.0 7.4
6-7 years 0.8 7.3 7.5 4.2 6.5
7-8 years 2.0 4.5 7.1 11.9 4.5
8-9 years 0.0 3.8 7.5 16.1 3.8
9-10 years 0.0 3.3 21.9 36.4 5.1
more than 10 years 0.0 15.3 4.6 7.7 12.2
Base 7,557 45,654 7,001 143 60,355
Note: because of rounding, small numbers may appear as zero when expressed as a percentage
of the total.
Table 4.15 shows that in most – about two-fifths – of cases, the partner was female.
Table 4.15 Stock couples: gender of partner
Col %
partner female 81.2
partner male 18.8
Base 60,355
Dependent children were present in the households of 64 per cent of partners (Table
4.16).18 Most common was to have either one or two children.
18 The children variables were sourced from the Generalised Matching Service (GMS).
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Table 4.16 Stock couples: number of children
Col %
children: none 36.1
children: 1 21.6
children: 2 20.9
children: 3 12.3
children: 4+ 9.1
Base 60,355
Of those with children, Table 4.17 shows that 22 per cent had a youngest child aged
less than two at the time of go-live day or, in a handful of cases, the child was born
shortly after this time. In most cases (73 per cent) the youngest child was of pre-
secondary school age.
Table 4.17 Stock couples: age of youngest child
Col %
age of youngest child: 0-1 (or pregnant) 21.9
age of youngest child: 2-5 25.3
age of youngest child: 6-10 25.4
age of youngest child: 11-19 27.5
Base 33,856
The average age of the partner at go-live day was 41 years. Table 4.18 shows that
partners under the age of 20 were rare. More than half were over the age of 40.
Table 4.18 Stock couples: age of partner
Col %
partner age: 16-20 1.0
partner age: 20-30 15.8
partner age: 31-40 29.7
partner age: 41-50 32.7
partner age: 51-60 20.9
Base 60,355
Table 4.19 shows that about six per cent of partners were recorded as having a
disability.
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Table 4.19 Stock couples: partner disability
Col %
partner has disability 5.9
partner has no disability 94.1
Base 60,355
The regional breakdown of the stock is shown in Table 4.20. To put this into context,
the second column in the table shows the population size of the regions in 2004.19
The third column presents a ‘location quotient’. This is simply calculated as a ratio of
the other two columns and indicates the extent to which WFIP stock couples are
over-represented in particular areas. Yorkshire & Humberside, the West Midlands
and London have roughly the numbers of WFIP couples one would expect based on
the size of their respective populations. The main over-representation appears to be
in Scotland, Wales, the North East and North West England. The South East has the
fewest stock WFIP couples as a proportion of its population.
Table 4.20 Stock couples: Jobcentre Plus region
Jobcentre Plus region WFIP stock (col %) Population (col %) LQ
Jobcentre Plus region: Scotland 11.7 8.7 1.3
Jobcentre Plus region: North East 6.4 4.4 1.5
Jobcentre Plus region: North West 15.7 11.7 1.3
Jobcentre Plus region: Yorkshire & Humberside 9.0 8.7 1.0
Jobcentre Plus region: Wales 7.3 5.1 1.4
Jobcentre Plus region: West Midlands 9.1 9.2 1.0
Jobcentre Plus region: East Midlands 6.5 7.4 0.9
Jobcentre Plus region: East 6.3 9.4 0.7
Jobcentre Plus region: South East 8.5 14.0 0.6
Jobcentre Plus region: London 12.9 12.8 1.0
Jobcentre Plus region: South West 6.7 8.7 0.8
Base 60,355
4.2.2 Participation in WFIP
As already noted, the original stock in our sample was downloaded within eight
weeks of go-live day. Figure 4.7 sheds a little more light on the issue of how long it
takes for the stock to actually attend a WFIP. The line in the chart shows the
probability of not having had a WFIP for those who remain eligible (i.e. the benefit
continues) by a specific time since the customer records were downloaded to LMS.
The process of WFI attendance was such that 72 per cent of those who remain on
benefit will not have attended a WFI within a year of their records being downloaded.
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Figure 4.7 The time taken to participate in WFIP, stock partners
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5 Impact analysis
Introduction and summary of main points
This chapter presents the estimates of the effects of Work Focused Interviews
for Partners (WFIP) and New Deal for |Partners (NDP), separately as well as in
combination. These are obtained using both difference in differences (DiD)
(including the random growth model) and instrumental variable (IV) approaches.
With the DiD estimates, the longest outcome that is observed is 37 weeks
after eligibility commences. For IV estimates, outcomes up to 12 (28-day)
months after WFIP participation are observed, albeit with reduced sample sizes
for the longer durations. The main findings for stock couples are:
• For stock couples, WFIP eligibility appears to reduce benefit claims after 37
weeks by about one percentage point. Assuming no deterrent effect implies
that WFIP participation reduced benefit claims among stock by around 4.6
percentage points. However, since significant effects were evident sooner
after eligibility than WFIP participation usually took place, the assumption
of no deterrent effect is unlikely to hold. In view of this, the estimated
effect on participation represents an upper bound on the true effect.
• There is no evidence to suggest that WFIP encouraged the movement from
non-employment to employment among stock couples.
• Stock couples on Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) were more likely to exit benefit
than those on other benefits. Those with less than two years benefit duration
were more likely to exit than those who had been on benefit for longer.
Those aged 25 – 45 were more likely to exit than those who were older or
younger than this.
• The effect of NDP eligibility on stock partners 37 weeks after eligibility
commenced was a decline of about one percentage point in benefit claims.
This was only marginally statistically significant. This effect of WFIP/NDP
combined was estimated to be similar, although these results appear a little
more statistically significant.
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The main findings for flow couples are:
• No significant effects of WFIP eligibility or participation are evident for flow
couples. This was true when considering the population as a whole and
when considering results separately according to whether claiming JSA or
according to age.
• Significant effects of NDP and NDP/WFIP combined were evident for flow
couples. In view of concerns over the data, these results are viewed as
being indicative of NDP and NDP/Work Focused Interview (WFI) causing a
significant reduction in benefit claiming but view the size of the estimated
effect as being unreliable.
With regard to the effect on NDP participation, WFIP participation increased
this by about 3.5 percentage points for stock and flow couples. For stock
couples, it was possible to look at variations across subgroups in the effect on
NDP take-up. As with the consideration of benefit outcomes, those on benefit
for less than two years, those claiming JSA and those aged 25-45 were more
likely than their counterparts to respond to WFIP participation by participating
in NDP.
5.1 Difference-in-differences estimates
This section contains the DiD estimates for both stock and flow couples. Estimates
are presented separately for the effect of WFIP, the effect of NDP and the combined
effect of WFIP and NDP. This is achieved by varying the definition of the treatment
and comparison groups, as described in Chapter 3. To recap, this operates as
follows:
• The effect of WFIP was estimated by having a treatment group of eligible couples
(in Jobcentre Plus areas) and a comparison group of couples who would be
eligible apart from the fact that they live in a non-Jobcentre Plus area. The
outcomes of the treatment group relative to the comparison group would, it is
assumed, remain unchanged apart from the disruption caused by the introduction
of WFIP. This means that observed differences in the relative outcomes can be
attributed to the effect of WFIP.
• The effect of NDP was estimated by having a treatment group of couples who
would be eligible apart from the fact that they lived in a non-Jobcentre Plus area
(i.e. the same group of couples who were used as the comparison group when
estimating the effect of WFIP) and a comparison group made up of lone parent
claiming Income Support (IS) who also lived in a non-Jobcentre Plus area. Again,
we view the relative outcomes of the treatment and control group to only be
disrupted by the fact that NDP was introduced (NDP was available to those living
in non-Jobcentre Plus areas). Consequently, observed differences in the relative
outcomes can be attributed to the effect of WFIP.
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• The combined effect of WFIP and NDP was estimated by having a treatment
group of eligible couples in Jobcentre Plus areas (i.e. the same treatment group
as when estimating the effect of WFIP) and a comparison group made up of
lone parents claiming IS who also lived in a Jobcentre Plus area. Now, the relative
outcomes of the treatment and control group are disrupted by the introduction
of both WFIP and NDP (since lone parents are eligible for neither). Consequently,
observed differences in the relative outcomes can be attributed to the combined
effect of WFIP and NDP.
5.1.1 Two preliminary comments on the results
Before presenting the results, there are two points that should be noted. First, it has
been noted already that the estimation sample deliberately excluded couples living
in areas that integrated into the Jobcentre Plus network between go-live day and the
end of September 2004. The result of this is that, the post-WFIP estimation sample
includes only those for whom the Jobcentre Plus status is consistent throughout the
period observed. Ideally, a similar process would have been carried out for the
pre-WFIP estimation sample (that is required for the DiD analysis) and, furthermore,
areas that were integrated into the Jobcentre Plus network at some point between
the dates of the pre- and post-WFIP estimation samples would have been excluded.
However, this was not possible. The main obstacle to doing this was that it would
have resulted in a considerable depletion of the estimation sample. A secondary
reason was that the data available on the timing of Jobcentre Plus integration was
shown to be inaccurate, particularly for those converting relatively early.
The results should be viewed with this in mind. The extent to which it biases the
results depends on whether the introduction of Jobcentre Plus influences movements
of benefits for the claimant partner. For those on non-JSA benefits, the bias is likely
to be small. All that is required of them under Jobcentre Plus is to attend an initial
interview when commencing their claim. Since eligibility for WFIP requires that the
benefit spell reaches the six month mark, the effect of any initial interview is likely to
be lost. The same is also true for those claiming JSA. However, since Jobcentre Plus
is likely to have been more effective for those on JSA, it is prudent to view the WFIP
impact estimates for JSA as an upper bound on the true effect.
The second point that requires some expansion relates to the lone parent comparison
group. The reason for needing such a comparison group is set out above. However,
lone parents are obviously fundamentally different from couples so the extent to
which it is possible to use them as a comparison group with a view to capturing the
counterfactual outcomes of the (couples) treatment group deserves some
consideration. One possible difficulty is that, in the course of the period covered by
the sample used for the DiD analysis, WFIs for lone parents were introduced. To
address this, the comparison group chosen was a sub-group of all lone parents,
selected on the basis of the age of the youngest child such that their requirement to
participate in WFIs was unchanged over the pre- and post-WFIP periods.
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However, there is still the possibility that lone parents do not operate effectively as a
comparison group. This in fact turns out to be the case. By carrying out
pre-programme tests (see Chapter 3) it is possible to assess the extent to which it is
valid to view the comparison group as capturing the counterfactual for the
treatment group. The results of these tests are given in the appendix. To summarise,
the tests were satisfied when using couples as a comparison group but were mostly
not satisfied when using lone parents as a comparison group. This prompted the
modification to the DiD approach discussed in Chapter 3. The estimated effects of
NDP and WFIP/NDP combined – i.e. the models that use lone parents as a
comparison group – are carried out using random growth models rather than a DiD
approach. Details of this approach are given in Dorsett (2005).
There is another point relevant to the use of lone parents as a comparison group that
relates to the extensive data manipulation required for constructing a useable
couples dataset. The lone parent data was much simpler to construct and did not rely
on as many assumptions to identify eligibility. The WFIP estimates are based on a
treatment group of couples and a comparison group that is also made up of couples.
Consequently, the assumptions made in setting up the data are shared by both the
treatment and comparison groups and effectively cancel each other out. For the
other estimates, however, the data set-up assumptions affect only the treatment
group, so there may be some systematic bias across the treatment and comparison
groups that exists for reasons wholly unrelated to the treatment of interest. To
address this, it was necessary to carry out further refinement of the couples data
when comparing with lone parents. This amounted to imputing some spell ends.
Doing so creates no problems when considering the effects at a population level but
limits the extent to which it is possible to examine subgroups. In view of this,
subgroup analysis is only carried out for the effect of WFIP. Aside from these data-
driven reasons for not being able to carry out subgroup analysis for the effects of
NDP and WFIP/NDP combined, the small number of NDP participants suggests there
might be little additional value in doing so.
5.1.2 The format of the presented results
The presentation of the results (and those in the appendix) follows a consistent
graphical format. The graphs show the estimated effects for a period of 37 weeks
following the date of eligibility (which in most cases is the 12 April 2004 for the
stock). Confidence intervals (labelled ‘CI’ in the charts) are also presented to indicate
significance. An effect is different from zero at standard levels of statistical
significance if the surrounding confidence intervals exclude zero. A significantly
negative effect indicates that WFIP (or whatever treatment is being considered) is
successful in reducing the proportion claiming benefit. All effects summarised in the
graphs are estimated within a regression framework. Most models additionally
control for those observable characteristics recorded in Working Age Statistical
Database (WASD), i.e. age, gender, children, the duration spent on benefit prior to
eligibility and the calendar time of eligibility.
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5.1.3 Stock: Benefit outcome
Effect of WFIP
Figure 5.1 shows the effect of WFIP eligibility for stock partners. As discussed in
Chapter 3, eligibility is distinct from participation. Specifically, not all of those who
are eligible will participate in WFIP. The effect of eligibility therefore represents a
combination of the effect of participation for those who participate and the
deterrent effect for those who do not participate. Consequently, it is debatable
what is driving the estimated effects; whether it is purely the participation effect,
purely the deterrent effect or, more realistically, some mix of the two.
The estimated effect of eligibility on benefit status is small but statistically significant.
The evolution of the effect over time appears fairly stable and, after 37 weeks,
reaches nearly -1. In other words, it appears that WFIP eligibility reduces benefit
claims after 37 weeks by about one percentage point.
Figure 5.1 Effect of WFIP eligibility for stock
These estimates can be adjusted to arrive at the more policy-relevant estimate of
WFIP participation. As mentioned in Chapter 3, doing so implicitly excludes the
possibility of a deterrent effect since it assumes that all observed effects are a result
of participation. Some consideration of this point is provided in the discussion
section at the end of this Chapter.
Figure 5.2 presents the estimated effects of WFIP participation. The effect is in most
cases significantly negative from 18 weeks following the date of eligibility. At the
end of the period of observation, the effect of WFIP participation is around 4.6,
indicating that the participation in WFIP reduced the benefit rates by 4.6 percentage
points. It should be emphasised that this represents an upper bound. In other words,
a participation effect of 4.6 percentage points is only possible if there is no deterrent
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effect. Should this not be the case, the true effect of participation will be smaller, and
possibly not statistically significantly different from zero.
Figure 5.2 Effect of WFIP participation on exit from benefit (stock)
Clearly, the interpretation of the results hinges to some extent on the existence of a
deterrent effect. It is possible to gain some insight into the likelihood of such an
effect existing by comparing how soon after eligibility a significant effect appears
with how quickly partners participate in WFIP. These estimates presented above
become significant about 17 weeks after the date of eligibility (and are close to
significance for quite a number of weeks before that). This is slightly earlier than the
average time taken to participate in WFIP and possibly indicates the operation of
deterrent effects; that is, individuals choosing to end spells rather than participate in
a WFIP.
Effect of NDP
The effect of WFIP eligibility can be considered in the same way. This is shown in
Figure 5.3. As with WFIP eligibility, the overall tendency is for NDP eligibility to
reduce by about one percentage point the proportion of couples claiming a benefit.
However, this effect should not be regarded as robust since it mostly falls slightly
short of significance at the conventional level. Overall, it appears that NDP eligibility
has little effect on whether or not the couple claim benefit. It seems plausible that
the effect is less than that of WFIP eligibility, particularly if one believes that the WFIP
effect is driven at least partly by a deterrent effect. Specifically, since NDP is a
voluntary programme there is no reason to believe it should have any associated
deterrent effect so any detected effect should be due to NDP participation.
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Figure 5.3 Effect of NDP on benefit rate (Stock sample)
Effect of WFIP/NDP combined
Figure 5.4 gives the estimated effects of WFIP/NDP combined. The estimated effects
are more or less similar in magnitude to the NDP effect, again reaching about one
percentage point after 37 weeks. However, the results appear a little more definite
and actually register as significant at the conventional level for most of the 36 weeks
following eligibility. Unlike the NDP effect discussed above, the combined WFIP/NDP
effect is likely to be partly driven by the deterrent effect since eligible couples are
required to participate in WFIP.
Figure 5.4 Combined WFI and NDP effects of eligibility (Stock sample)
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Subgroup analysis
In this sub-section, the extent to which the results vary across subgroups of the
eligible population is considered. As the descriptive analysis has revealed,
heterogeneous groups of partners are eligible for WFIP. In particular, the type of
benefit paid to main claimants and the duration of the claim before eligibility might
affect the outcomes of WFIP. To explore this, the effect of WFIP participation was
estimated separately in different subsamples. All results have been estimated as the
effect of eligibility, subsequently adjusted to provide the effect of WFIP participation.
This means that the estimated effects assume no deterrent effects or, put another
way, the estimated effects represent upper bounds on the true effects of participation.
Figure 5.5 shows the effect of WFIP participation on those receiving JSA. For this
subgroup, a pronounced and significantly negative effect of – ten percentage points
was found after 16 weeks, showing a high effectiveness of the programme for this
subgroup (although the earlier proviso relating to the introduction of Jobcentre Plus
should be borne in mind). The effect of WFIP remains significantly negative up to the
end of the period of observation and increases in absolute terms; after 37 weeks, the
effect is estimated at 18 percentage points. It is notable that the confidence intervals
are much wider than has been the case for the results presented in earlier charts. This
is the result of the estimation being based on a smaller number of couples (i.e. just
those receiving JSA) and it means the effect is less precisely estimated than in
previous charts. It is important to bear this in mind when considering the results.
While there is clear evidence of WFIP reducing the probability of claiming benefits,
the size of this effect 37 weeks after eligibility may differ substantially from the 18
percentage points shown in the chart.
Figure 5.5 Effect of WFIP participation on exit from benefit (stock,
JSA claimants)
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Figure 5.6 shows corresponding results for those claiming a benefit other than JSA.
The larger number of couples on non-JSA benefits means that the effects are
estimated much more precisely, as indicated by the width of the confidence interval.
The estimated effect is much weaker than for those claiming JSA. Although it is
negative throughout, this effect is not statistically significant, except marginally
about seven weeks after eligibility. The clear finding is that couples in receipt of JSA
are more likely than those on other benefits to respond to WFIP by leaving benefit.
Figure 5.6 Effect of WFIP participation on exit from benefit (stock,
non-JSA claimants)
As shown in Chapter 4, in many cases the benefit spell that existed at the time of
eligibility is very long. It is of interest to examine how effectiveness varies according
to length of spell. Figures 5.7 and 5.8 show effects for two subgroups with benefit
durations of either less or more than two years. The effect of WFIP participation is
significantly negative and substantial (16 percentage points after 37 weeks) for
those with a benefit of less than two years duration.
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Figure 5.7 Effect of WFIP participation on exit from benefit (stock,
on benefit less than two years)
For those with longer benefit spells, Figure 5.8 shows no WFIP effect. Here, the
estimated effect is precisely estimated (as indicated by the narrow confidence
intervals surrounding the estimates) but still remain close to zero throughout.
Hence, it is clear that it is among couples with shorter benefit spells that WFIP has a
stronger effect.
Figure 5.8 Effect of WFIP participation on exit from benefit (stock,
on benefit more than two years)
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Figure 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11 consider the extent to which the effectiveness of WFIP
participation varies according to the age of the main claimant. No significant effects
of WFIP participation were detected for couples where the main claimant was aged
under 25. Although the effects are imprecisely estimated, they appear to fluctuate
around zero, at least for the first 19 or so weeks after eligibility commence,
suggesting that the lack of significance may reflect a true absence of an effect rather
than simply being the result of a small sample size.
Figure 5.9 Effect of WFIP participation on exit from benefit (stock,
main claimant under 25)
Figure 5.10 shows a significant negative effect for couples where the claimant is
aged between 25 and 45. For such prime working-age couples, participation
reduced benefits claims by 7.5 percentage points 37 weeks after the date of
eligibility. The effect appears steady over time.
Impact analysis
70
Figure 5.10 Effect of WFIP participation on exit from benefit (stock,
main claimant 25-44)
In Figure 5.11, couples where the claimant partner is aged 45 or over are considered.
Here, the effect is consistently insignificant and close to zero. Taking the results for
subgroups defined by the age of the claimant partner as a whole, it appears that the
effectiveness of the programme is mainly delivered through its effect on prime-age
(25-44 year old) couples.
Figure 5.11 Effect of WFIP participation on exit from benefit (stock,
main claimant over 45)
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Summarising the results of the sub-group analysis, it is clear that some couples
respond more readily than others to the requirement to attend a WFIP. In particular,
couples who claim JSA, who have been on benefit for less than two years and have
a claimant partner aged between 25 and 44 appear most likely to exit benefit in
response to this requirement. The results provide upper bounds on the effects of
WFIP participation. However, it should be borne in mind that upper bounds are only
plausible if there is no deterrent effect. In all likelihood, the participation effects will
be smaller and at least some of the observed effects will be capturing couples’
decisions to end their benefit spell rather than participate in WFIP.
5.1.4 Flow: Benefit outcome
Effect of WFIP
In this section, the analysis carried out for the stock is repeated for the flow. Figure
5.12 shows the estimated effect of eligibility. No significant effects of WFIP eligibility
are evident for flow couples. This is in contrast to the stock couples where a
significant reduction in the level of benefits was found. This is surprising if one
believes the eligibility effect operates largely through participation in WFIP since it
seems plausible that flow clients are easier to help than stock clients. The fact that
the effect is actually greater for the stock therefore adds to the evidence supporting
the view that the deterrent effect is driving the observed WFIP effects.
Figure 5.12 Effect of WFIP eligibility on main claimant exit from
benefit (flow)
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This lack of significance translates into insignificant results when considering the
effect of participation rather than eligibility (Figure 5.13). It is notable that the
estimates relating to the end of the period of observation are based on very few
participants, resulting in big confidence intervals surrounding the estimated WFIP
participation effects. In the weeks before the confidence intervals expand rapidly
(that is, before about week 34), the estimated effects remain close to zero indicating
that, even if it is assumed that there is no deterrent effect for the flow, the estimated
effect of participation is still small.
Figure 5.13 Effect of WFIP participation on exit from benefit (flow)
Effect of NDP
Figure 5.14 shows the estimated effect of NDP on flow couples. After 37 weeks, the
estimated effect is of about a seven percentage point decline in benefits. While this
is significantly negative, it is based on a relatively small number of couples, as
reflected in the widening confidence intervals. Given concerns about the comparison
group used in the estimation of the NDP and combined WFIP/NDP effects, it is
advisable to not pay too close attention to the size of the estimated effect but rather
to focus on the fact that NDP appears to cause flow couples to exit benefit in a way
that was not observed among stock couples.
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Figure 5.14 Effect of NDP on benefit rate (flow)
Combined effect of WFIP and NDP
Estimates of the combined WFIP/NDP effect for the flow are given in Figure 5.15. The
estimated effect is of a decline of three percentage points by the end of the
observation period. Again, the confidence intervals of the estimated effects widen
towards the end of the observation period, reducing the precision of the estimate
(although still indicating a significant effect). The estimated effects are quite similar
in size to those of NDP alone (previous chart) which is to be expected since WFIP has
been shown to have no significant effect on benefit exits for flow couples.
Figure 5.15 Combined WFI and NDP effects of eligibility (flow)
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Subgroup analysis
As with the stock, it is interesting to consider how the estimated effects vary across
different types of couples. In this section, differences between those claiming JSA
and those claiming other benefits are considered. Also, variations by age of main
claimant are presented. However, it is not possible to examine variations by duration
of benefit spell; most flow couples have been claiming benefit for six months at the
time they become eligible.
Figure 5.16 shows the effects of WFIP participation for the JSA couples. The effect of
WFIP on the main claimant’s benefit rate is not significantly different from zero for all
37 weeks following the date of eligibility.
Figure 5.16 Effect of WFIP participation on exit from benefit (flow,
JSA claimants)
Figure 5.17 shows some significant effects for the non-JSA couples. About nine
weeks after eligibility, a significant reduction of roughly five percentage points was
seen. The effect was evident at this level or thereabouts until roughly 24 weeks after
eligibility, albeit at the margins of statistical significance. Beyond this point, the
results become less stable and less significant.
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Figure 5.17 Effect of WFIP participation on exit from benefit (flow,
non-JSA claimants)
Figures 5.18 to 5.20 consider variation by the age of the claimant partner. No
significant effects are found for any of the age groups.
Figure 5.18 Effect of WFIP participation on exit from benefit (flow,
main claimant under 25)
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Figure 5.19 Effect of WFIP participation on exit from benefit (flow,
main claimant 25-44)
Figure 5.20 Effect of WFIP participation on exit from benefit (flow,
main claimant over 45)
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5.1.5 Effects on NDP programme uptake
Given the small numbers caseloaded to NDP, estimates of the effect of WFIP were
produced for the stock and flow combined rather than separately. Table 5.1 shows
the DiD results of WFIP on participation in NDP. WFIP eligibility appears to increase
participation in NDP by nearly one percentage point. Participation in WFIP appears to
increase NDP participation by about 3.7 percentage points. Both effects are
significantly different from zero.
Table 5.1 Effect of WFIP participation on NDP participation
Eligibility WFIP participation
Effect on NDP participation 0.89 3.68
(% point difference in take-up)
5.2 Instrumental variable estimates
This section contains the IV estimates of the effect of WFIP on the NDP, benefit and
employment status of those stock couples that existed at the time of go-live day.20
We implement this as follows:
a) compare the outcomes of those whose records were downloaded to Labour
Market System (LMS) in the first four weeks following go-live day with those
whose records were downloaded later
b) compare the level of WFIP participation among those whose records were
downloaded to LMS in the first four weeks following go-live day with that among
those whose records were downloaded later
c) divide a) by b) to get an estimate of the effect of WFIP participation on outcomes.
As described in Chapter 3, this approach requires that the instrumental variable
influences the probability of receiving treatment but does not influence the
outcome of interest. In this case, the instrumental variable is the indicator of early
LMS download. It has already been shown that early download increases the
probability of WFIP participation. Furthermore, in view of the fact that the timing of
download was randomly assigned, it is clear that this in itself cannot influence
outcomes. Hence, the two requirements for the instrument are met.
Two further points should be mentioned before turning to the results themselves.
First, the outcomes considered are all measured relative to the time of WFIP
participation. Obviously, those who do not participate have no such start date. To
20 It was not possible to estimate the separate effect of NDP. This was due primarily
to the small number of NDP participants causing the resulting estimates to be
highly unstable.
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get around this problem, a pseudo-start date was imputed for the non-participants.
For each non-participant, a pseudo-start date was imputed as a random draw from
the distribution of actual start dates observed among the participants. This is a
standard approach that has been used in a number of other evaluations.
The second point is related to the first. Since outcomes are measured relative to the
time of (pseudo-) participation, the estimates of longer term effects will be based on
fewer observations than the effects of shorter term outcomes. This is an analogous
situation to that described in more detail for the DiD results. However, a further
consideration is relevant. As well as observing outcomes after WFIP participation,
outcomes before participation are also observed. This provides a helpful check on
the validity of the results. Specifically, since the IV results relate to those who actually
participate, there should be no significant pre-participation effects. This is included
in the consideration of results below.
5.2.1 The format of the presented results
As with the DiD results, the IV results are presented graphically. However, the results
are slightly different in three respects. First, rather than a period of 37 weeks post-
eligibility, the IV results cover a period of 12 (28-day) months after participating in
WFIP. Second, the graphs extend back into negative time; that is, effects for the 11
months prior to participation are also included. This allows consideration of the
validity of the results along the lines of the specification check described above.
Third, three outcomes are considered: NDP participation, benefit status and
employment status.
5.2.2 The estimated effects of WFIP participation
Figure 5.21 shows the estimated effects of WFIP participation on NDP take-up. Prior
to the month of participation (month 0), no significant effects are evident. This
provides reassurances that the effects for later months are valid. From the point of
participation onwards, there is a significant positive effect on NDP caseload. The
immediacy of this start presumably reflects the fact that some partners agree in their
WFIP interview to be caseloaded. The effect for later months is reasonably stable.
WFIP increases NDP caseload by about 3.5 percentage points.
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Figure 5.21 Effect of WFIP participation on NDP caseload
The effect on benefit claims is shown in Figure 5.22. Again, there is no significant
effect in the months before participation, so the results for later months are not in
question. However, the pattern of results is less clear than when considering the
effect on NDP. The effect in the month of participation is not significantly different
from zero. In months one and two, there does appear to be an effect of about five or
six percentage points, although this is only marginally significant. In other words,
WFIP participation may increase the probability of being on benefit for a couple of
months following participation. The effect fluctuates around this level up until nine
months post-participation, moving between insignificance and marginal significance.
In months ten and 11, the effect moves closer to zero (the final month is based on
too few cases to be reliable and should be ignored). Overall, there is a suggestion
that WFIP participation might increase the probability of being on benefit, but there
is considerable variation in these estimates and they are only ever marginally
significant.
Figure 5.22 Effect of WFIP participation on benefit claims
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The other outcome considered is the employment status of the partner. This is
presented in Figure 5.23. Unlike the other results, inspection of the months prior to
WFIP participation shows significant estimated effects. This casts doubts on the
effects estimated in the post-participation period to the extent that they cannot be
viewed as reliable, despite the fact they mostly suggest a significantly positive effect
on employment. As an informal observation, the average effect over all months
from WFIP participation onwards is estimated at about six percentage points. This is
the same size as the average effect over the pre-participation months. If this
pre-participation average is regarded as a measure of the bias in the results, the
conclusion is that WFIP has no effect on partner employment.
Figure 5.23 Effect of WFIP participation on partner employment
Subgroup analysis
The analysis was repeated for the same subgroups considered in the DiD section.
That is, results were produced separately for:
• couples claiming JSA versus couples not claiming JSA
• couples where the benefit spell was less than two years in duration versus couples
where the benefit spell was more than two years in duration
• couples where the partner was aged 25-45 versus couples where the partner
was over the age of 45.21
21 This differs from the DiD analysis where it was the age of the claimant partner
that was used. This reflects the fact that the age of the partner was more accurately
recorded in the participants’ data than the age of the claimant. Furthermore,
although couples where the partner was under the age of 25 were also
considered, they were too few in number to provide any robust results so have
been excluded from this sub-section.
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In the interest of brevity, the discussion in this section takes the form more of a
summary than a full account. Furthermore, only the effects on NDP and benefit are
presented; as noted above, the effects on employment are not sufficiently credible
as to warrant consideration.
As with the findings of the DiD analysis, those on benefit for less than two years,
those claiming JSA and those aged 25-45 were more likely than their counterparts to
respond to WFIP participation by participating in NDP. Among each of these more
responsive subgroups the estimated effect on NDP was in the region of five
percentage points, compared to about three percentage points for those in the
alternative subgroups.
The effects on benefit are less clear and appear a little erratic when considering sub-
groups. They mostly suggest that WFIP participation has little effect on the
probability of being on benefit.
5.3 Discussion of the results
The purpose of this section is to draw together the estimation results and discuss
them in the context of the data problems documented earlier in this report. As an
overall comment, the data quality issues mean that the results are less definite than
would be desired, although this affects estimates of the effect of NDP and WFIP/NDP
combined more than the effects of WFIP alone. Below, the key findings are
considered under a series of headings.
Does the possibility of a Jobcentre Plus effect undermine the evaluation results?
A first point to comment on is the potential bias in the results due to the fact that the
treatment group includes areas that were not integrated into the Jobcentre Plus
network in 2003 (the ‘before’ period in the DiD analyses) but were integrated by
April 2004 (the ‘after’ period). Although this means that the estimated effects will
incorporate the effects of Jobcentre Plus integration in some cases, the nature of the
client group means such contamination of the estimates should be small, as argued
above. To explore the possible extent of such a bias, some further analysis was
carried out restricting the treatment group to those areas that were already
integrated into the Jobcentre Plus network in 2003. This gave results qualitatively
similar to those based on that definition of the treatment group that does not
impose this restriction (i.e. the definition used in this report). For the stock, the
estimated effect of WFIP participation under the narrower definition is about one
percentage point larger. For the flow, the results are again insignificantly different
from zero in most cases, apart from at about 20 weeks after eligibility, when a
significant ten percentage point decrease was found. Since the difference between
the two sets of results were generally small, the DiD estimates were based on the
broader definition of the treatment group that did not exclude areas converting to
Jobcentre Plus at some point between 2003 and 2004. This has the advantage that
the samples chosen correspond to the actual eligible population.
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Why the effect of WFIP on benefit claims appears to be due to a deterrent effect
The DiD estimates of the effect of WFIP suggest little effect on flow couples but more
substantial effects on stock couples. This is a little surprising in that one might expect
those less established in their reliance on benefits to be more responsive to any
work-focused intervention. The DiD results indicate that there is essentially no effect
on flow couples but that, if there is no deterrent effect associated with WFIP, levels
of benefit receipt would fall by about 4.5 percentage points for stock couples who
participate in WFIP.
Clearly, the question of a possible deterrent effect is important in understanding
these results. Specifically, this is the possibility that the requirement to attend a WFIP
acts to encourage benefit exits. If true, the DiD participation estimates represent an
upper bound on the true participation effects since they wrongly regard the
deterrent effect as part of the participation effect. Should a deterrent effect exist,
this may help reconcile the seemingly contradictory DiD and IV results. The fact that
the IV results show the effect of WFIP participation to be mostly insignificant
suggests that the main effect of WFIP for stock couples is in fact a deterrent effect,
and this is what the DiD results capture.
Another finding that supports the existence of a deterrent effect is that the effect of
WFIP eligibility for stock couples appears very soon after eligibility begins. Since
there are considerable delays involved when interviewing stock couples (of those
having a WFIP, the average time from start of eligibility to having a WFIP booked was
123 days, with a further 13 days required until WFIP attendance) it seems likely that
the observed impact of eligibility precedes WFIP participation and is in fact the
manifestation of the deterrent effect. While it is not possible to identify the deterrent
effect precisely, the estimated eligibility effect represents an upper bound. So, at
most, the deterrent effect causes a one percentage point reduction in the level of
benefit claims among those eligible for WFIP.22
On balance, it appears that the observed effects for the stock are driven by a
deterrent effect and that WFIP participation does little to encourage benefit exit.
What are the other effects of WFIP?
The IV results provide estimates of the effect of WFIP participation without having to
make any assumptions about the possibility of a deterrent effect. The effects of WFIP
participation on NDP participation are very clear; WFIP increases NDP participation
by about 3.5 percentage points. In fact, the DiD and IV approaches agree on this
effect, despite the fact that the former is based on both stock and flow couples while
the latter relates only to the original stock.
22 In trying to reconcile these results, it is important to be aware that the upper
bound on the deterrent effect cannot coexist with the upper bound on the
participation effect. This is because the upper bound on the deterrent effect
assumes no participation effect while the upper bound on participation assumes
no deterrent effect.
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The IV results suggest that WFIP participation has no effect on moving into
employment. However, the measure of employment available does not provide any
information on hours worked. A move from part-time to full-time employment
would not be captured by the data since both are simply recorded as employment.
As a final comment on the effect of WFIP, it is apparent that some groups of partners
are more likely to respond to WFIP than others. Stock couples on JSA are more likely
to exit benefit than those on other benefits, those with less than two years benefit
duration are more likely to exit than those who have been on benefit for longer and
those who are aged 25-45 are more likely to exit than those who are older or
younger than this. They are also more likely to participate in NDP as a result of WFIP
participation.
What can we say about the effects of NDP and WFIP/NDP combined?
The results for the effect of NDP and NDP/WFI are somewhat more tentative. This is
for a number of reasons. First, they rely on lone parents as a comparison group. The
pre-programme tests of the comparison group reveal a bias in the DiD estimates
when using lone parents as a comparison group and this has been addressed in the
analysis by using a random growth model. However, this model itself assumes that
the bias uncovered by the pre-programme tests remains constant – there is no way
of checking this. Second, there is also the complication that the number of NDP
participants is much smaller than the number of WFIP participants. Third, the
difference in the data sources means that there are inconsistencies across couples
and lone parents in how the dataset was constructed. In particular, while there were
difficulties encountered using WASD data to identify eligible couples, similar
problems were not encountered with the identification of lone parents.
Another caveat attached to the results for NDP and NDP/WFI combined is that only
the effects of eligibility as identified in the WASD data are presented. The eligibility
effects for WFIP were adjusted (using the Bloom approach) to relate to that
proportion of seemingly eligible couples who were actually identified in the
participants database as eligible. Applying the Bloom adjustment is not
straightforward when using a comparison group that is so different from the
treatment group. A comparison of the estimated effects of eligibility for WFIP and
NDP must be carried out with this in mind. Specifically, since it has been shown that
WASD overestimates the size of the eligible group identified in the participants
database, the estimated NDP effects are likely to be underestimates of the effect of
true eligibility.
With this in mind, the results show that eligibility for NDP appears mostly to have had
little effect in encouraging stock couples to move away from benefit. Although the
effect of NDP eligibility is estimated to be fairly stable at about one percentage point,
it mostly fails to attain statistical significance. This lack of effect may be partly
attributable to the fact that there is no reason to believe a deterrent effect of NDP
should exist – participation is, after all, voluntary.
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WFIP/NDP combined, on the other hand, does appear to encourage stock couples to
leave benefit. This is unsurprising given the earlier findings relating to the effectiveness
of WFIP among stock couples and, coupled with the finding of no significant effects
of NDP eligibility, suggests the combined WFIP/NDP effects simply capture the
already-reported WFIP effects. Consequently, the same interpretation is relevant;
the effect is likely to be attributable to the deterrent effect of WFIP.
For flow couples, more substantial effects of eligibility are found. These results are
puzzling to the extent that they suggest the effect of NDP alone is greater than the
effect of WFIP/NDP. Rather than being a reliable substantive finding, this is more
likely to reflect the data problems encountered with this analysis. It is worth noting
that the estimated effects of NDP are not significantly different from the combined
WFIP/NDP effects. The results also appear suspicious since they show very high
effects of eligibility as identified by WASD which would translate into implausibly
high estimates of the effects of participation. In view of these concerns with the
estimates of NDP and WFIP/NDP combined, it is perhaps most prudent to comment
that they act to encourage benefit exits, but the size of effect is not reliably
estimated.
Impact analysis
85
6 Conclusion
The aim of this report has been to evaluate the effectiveness of Work Focused
Interviews for Parents (WFIP) and New Deal for Partners (NDP), separately and in
combination. This has been achieved through the use of administrative records on
benefit receipt, employment spells and WFIP and NDP participation. Extensive
manipulation of the administrative databases was required in order for them to be
useable for evaluation purposes.
To a certain extent, this has made the estimated results less reliable than desired,
although this mainly affects the estimates of NDP and WFIP/NDP combined rather
than the impact estimates for WFIP. This is for two reasons. First, the evaluation of
the WFIP effects was based on a database of couples only rather than a mix of
couples and lone parents. Second, two separate data sources were available on
which to estimate the effect of WFIP. This allowed for some cross-validation of
results. It is worth noting that the estimated effects of WFIP are the most policy-
relevant results if, as the evidence suggests, levels of self-referral to NDP are low.
Essentially, these estimates capture the effect of a mandatory WFIP and any resulting
NDP participation.
The results show that WFIP eligibility increases benefit exits among stock couples but
not among flow couples. This is slightly surprising since a natural assumption would
be that those newly entering WFIP eligibility would react more positively to the
support provided by WFIP (and NDP) than those who had been claiming benefits for
a longer period of time. The most likely explanation may be that the observed effect
is being driven by stock couples ending their benefit spell rather than participate in
a WFIP. This could account for a reduction of up to one percentage point in benefit
claims among those eligible for WFIP. In other words, participation in WFIP does not
appear to noticeably reduce the probability of claiming benefit but the requirement
to attend a WFIP does appear to cause some stock couples to end their benefit spell.
In line with the finding that WFIP participation does little to reduce the number of
couples on benefit, no effect of WFIP participation on employment entry was
evident. It would have been interesting to examine the related issue of whether WFIP
participation increased hours worked. However, the employment information
available does not provide details on hours of work. It remains possible that some
partners increased their hours of work as a result of WFIP participation. However,
without more detailed data, this is impossible to investigate.
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One area in which WFIP participation does appear to have had an effect is on signing
up for NDP. The estimation results indicate that WFIP participation increases the
probability of NDP participation by about 3.5 percentage points. While the size of
the effect is not large in absolute terms, relative to the small proportion of eligible
partners entering NDP it represents a substantial increase. To see this, note that
levels of NDP participation among partners who are eligible for WFIP but have not
attended a WFIP is only 0.5 per cent. Hence, WFIP has been successful in one of its
key aims; encouraging partners to think more positively about the labour market
and, as a first step, to participate in NDP.
It is possible that this increase in NDP participation may, in turn, lead to a reduction
in benefit claims. There is little reason to believe this will happen for stock couples.
For couples newly entering WFIP eligibility, however, the results suggest that NDP
may be effective in encouraging a move away from benefits.
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87Appendices – Pre-programme tests
Appendix
Pre-programme tests
This appendix presents the results of the pre-programme tests of the suitability of
the comparison groups used in the difference in differences (DiD) analyses. As
discussed in Chapter 3, the idea behind such tests is that if the outcome of interest
changes in the comparison group in a similar way to how it changes in the treatment
group then a DiD estimate based on two periods before the treatment should not
show any significant differences between the two groups. If a significant effect is
found, this motivates the use of the random growth model which essentially regards
such pre-treatment ‘effects’ as an estimate of bias and takes account of this when
providing impact estimates.
A.1 Pre-programme tests for the effect of WFIP
The following two charts show the results of a pre-programme test for the effect of
Work Focused Interviews for Partners (WFIP) based on the eligible population in
Jobcentre Plus areas and non-Jobcentre Plus areas in the years 2002 and 2003, i.e.
before the introduction of the WFIP. Figure A.1 indicates that no significant effect
was found in the pre-programme period for the group of eligible partners from the
stock. For the flow, Figure A.2 shows that the test fails in some instances. However,
since these are very few in number are only marginally significant, we proceed with
the DiD approach rather than the random growth approach in the analysis for the
effect of WFIP for both the stock and the flow.
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Figure A.1 WFIP effect: pre-programme test for stock couples
Figure A.2 WFIP effect: pre-programme test for flow couples
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A.2 Pre-programme tests for the effects of NDP
Figure A.3 shows the pre-programme test results for the stock. No significant effects
were found.
Figure A.3 NDP effect: pre-programme test for the stock couples
The results for the flow are shown in Figure A.4. Here, the tests fail. Consequently,
random growth models are used to take account of the weaknesses in the
comparison group when considering the effects of New Deal for Partners (NDP). For
consistency, this was done for both the stock and the flow (although not strictly
necessary for the flow).
Figure A.4 NDP effect: pre-programme test for the flow sample
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A.4 Pre-programme tests for the effects of WFIP and NDP
combined
Finally, Figures A.5 and A.6 present the pre-programme tests of relating to the
combined effects of WFIP and NDP for the stock and flow respectively. In both cases,
the tests are failed, prompting use of the random growth model.
Figure A.5 WFIP/NDP combined effect: pre-programme test for
stock couples
Figure A.6 WFIP/NDP combined effect: pre-programme test for flow
couples
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